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ABSTRACT
United States Household Carbon Footprints:
Quantifying the relationship between household-level income inequality and
greenhouse gas emissions (1996-2015)
SEPTEMBER 2021
JARED STARR, B.A., GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Craig Nicolson
As long as humanity has existed, we have altered our environment to provide goods,
services, and (more recently) wealth to people. Over the last several centuries, the
scope and pace of this transformation has accelerated with the onset of
technological innovation, social and economic reorganization, and an ensuing
population boom. Today, humanity’s demands on nature have become the dominant
force shaping the critical earth systems upon which all life depends. From local landuse change to the global climate many of these anthropogenic pressures pose an
existential threat to nature and the dependent social systems that rely on them. Yet,
extreme economic and social inequality within and across human societies leads to
significant inequality in who reaps the benefits of these transformations, who reaps
the harms, and who makes the decisions on that benefit-harm distribution. Here I
quantify, at high granularity and over a 20-year period (1996-2015), the GHG
emissions footprints of United States households, based on the flow of income,
goods and services these emissions enable. I compare the scale and distributions of

x

household-level GHG emissions across different social groups and responsibility
frameworks and provide policy insights related to those findings.
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CHAPTER 1
1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview
Individual people and society, writ large, are fundamentally dependent on a
steady flow of ecosystem goods and services to meet our wants and needs (1).
Over the millennia, the scale and scope of these wants and needs has
increased with growing populations and rising living standards. Today, human
society is over 7 billion strong and people are living longer, attaining higher levels of
education, capturing more wealth, gaining food and energy security, travelling
further, and participating in a globally-connected society (2).
Such remarkable gains provide significant human benefits, yet the scale of
environmental transformation underpinning these benefits is resulting in
increasingly dangerous levels of environmental change (3–5). At scales ranging from
local to global, human demands are transforming natural systems in ecologically
significant ways that fundamentally reduce their biodiversity (6), resiliency, and
ability to provide future ecosystem services (4, 5).
Such changes are not just concerning for those who care about “nature”, but
also for those who care about people. Our global society depends on stable natural
systems: a) from which we produce food, raw materials, and energy; upon which we
build our homes, cities, roads, and ports; and to which we send airborne, liquid, and
solid waste for processing. As humanity alters the natural systems that produce
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value for people, we are reducing their stability, resiliency, dependability, and basic
ability to continue producing valuable goods in the future (7).
With the global population projected to swell by 2 billion or more by midcentury, the economy expected to triple (8), and nature already flashing warning
signs that human demands are unsustainable, society is drifting down an
existentially dangerous path. If we are to welcome billions more people onto the
planet and they are to live wealthier lives, then we must find ways to dramatically
reduce net environmental impacts: thereby ensuring basic environmental integrity.
To do so, requires thoughtful decision-making in our social, political, and
economic systems to balance present and future human wellbeing while
maintaining the stable productive ecosystems that underpin this wellbeing. Such
decisions, in turn, require a deep empirically-based understanding of the humannature relationship as it interacts across space, time, and scales.
My work here focuses on one aspect of this relationship: the connection
between greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and the income and consumption benefits
these emissions enable. Specifically, I link U.S. households with the global GHG
emissions used to generate their income and produce the goods and services they
consume. I do this at high granularity, over a 20-year period, and analyze how
economic inequality and race shape the distribution of GHG emissions
responsibility.
In doing so, this work gives insight into two key trends shaping society’s
relationship with nature, in recent decades: long globalized supply chains and
uneven resource distribution within society. These trends mean that massive
2

environmental change in one geographic area may be ultimately driven by a small
group of consumers (or shareholders) halfway across the globe that reap the
benefits of this transformation, while other groups within society are left to face the
harms of this transformation. My work reveals these connections and in doing so
highlights some policy choices that can help achieve the more ambitious targets of
the United Nations 2015 Paris Agreement, to stabilize the global climate.

1.2 Tools for quantifying coupled human-nature systems
People and nature are coupled in complex relationships that span dimensions
of organizational levels, time, and space (9). Humanity is a part of nature,
fundamentally dependent on our environment for the raw materials and basic
conditions that make our lives, societies, and economies possible. Nature is likewise
powerfully shaped by people. As humanity’s population and consumption have
grown, people have become the dominant force driving global environmental
change (10). Thus, nature’s wellbeing is increasingly determined by humanity’s
choices.
In recent decades several integrated-system frameworks have emerged to
quantify these coupled human-nature connections (11). These include ecosystem
services (1, 12), human-nature nexus (11, 13), telecoupling (9, 14), and
environmental footprints (15–21).
While ecosystem services are a powerful framework to understand and value
the Support, Regulation, Provisioning, and Cultural services nature provides to
people, environmental footprints are a way to quantify the flow of such
3

environmental services through society. These can measure both the quantities of
goods and/or services appropriated from nature and the quantities of pollution sent
back to nature. Mathis Wackernagel and William Rees pioneered this field with the
development of the Ecological Footprint (EF) in the early 1990s (22, 23). For a given
geographical scale, the EF framework defines a concept called “biocapacity” and
provides standardized methods for assessing 1) the total biocapacity of that
geographic unit at a point in time, and 2) how much of that total available
biocapacity people consume in a given time period. By progressively aggregating
geographic units up to the ultimate scale of the whole earth, the EF framework
allows one to assess whether humanity’s demands on natural systems are within
nature’s constraints, and, if they exceed those constraints, by how much. This
framework helps quantify how certain wealthy nations have disproportionately
consumed more than their “fair share” of environmental resources while the
burdens of environmental change are disproportionately concentrated on those in
the developing world (24).
When combined with data on monetary transactions (using input-output (IO)
tables), this kind of accounting ties together actors up, down, and across a supply
chain by tracking how materials, energy, emissions, or some other environmental
indicator of interest flow through different sectors of an economy. This reveals
environmental inputs or outputs that are embodied in the production recipe (25).
Comparing these production recipes for different economic sectors within a
country, across countries, or analyzing the same sector in different countries reveals
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the scale and scope of a sector’s environmental demands (i.e. its environmental
footprint).
Since the work of Wackernagel and Rees, environmental-extended multiregion input-output (EE-MRIO) tables have been further developed and applied to
several resource/topic specific areas like energy (20), nitrogen (17), biodiversity
(18, 26), materials (21), and water, land, and carbon (16, 27). Such footprints reveal
how resource demands vary across countries and can be normalized to show
national level per-capita resources consumption.
In terms of GHG footprints, by tracking individual consumer’s purchases from
these sectors, final demand consumers can be connected to the full supply chain
GHG emissions used to produce the goods and services they purchase (embodied
consumption-based GHG responsibility) (Fig. 1.1). Conversely, GHG emissions can
also be linked to income they generate by either tracking to whom income flows
when GHG emissions occur along the supply chain (direct producer-income GHG
responsibility) or to whom income flows when the fossil fuels that enabled
downstream emissions enter the economy (supplier-income GHG footprint). The
total emissions in all accounting methods are exactly the same, but they differ in
terms of how those emissions are distributed across households.
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Fig. 1.1: A simplified diagram of responsibility frameworks. In supplierincome responsibility (blue), those who receive income by supplying fossil
fuels (this captures direct extraction companies and all those along the entire
supply chain who directly or indirectly interact with them: such as machine
suppliers, banks, or consulting companies) are assigned full responsibility for
all GHG emissions. In a producer-income responsibility (green), those
receiving income from an industry are assigned responsibility for emissions
directly emitted by that industry. Finally, consumer responsibility (gold)
assigns all emissions responsibility to those consuming the goods and services
those emissions were used to produce.
In this way, the EE-MRIO footprints can link individual consumers,
households, or categories of consumers (e.g. categorized by income level, race, age,
region) to their consumption-responsibility (28–39), income-based responsibility
(40–46), or a shared / total responsibility that apportions some responsibility to
each method (44, 47–50).
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1.3 Existing research gaps
Prior work has been done to quantify U.S. national-level GHG emissions based
on direct producer emissions (51), consumption-based emissions (52), and supplier
income-emissions (43). This has also been explored for U.S. households, for a single
time period (28, 35, 38) and more recently for a time series (29). While some prior
consumption-based studies investigate differences in footprints related to per capita
or household income, no peer-reviewed studies have focused on very high-income
households. To date, the maximum group reported is per capita income above
$200,000. While this is by no means a paltry amount, it is far below the minimum
needed to count as a top 1% U.S. household ($535,000) and well below the average
income of that group ($1.5 million). This top 1% group is critical to understand
because not only does its income allow for disproportionately high consumption
levels, but it is this group’s preferences that determine U.S. public policy (53).
It is also worth noting two working papers that do make estimates for highincome U.S. groups. Ummel (54) estimates GHG footprints of ~6 million simulated
U.S. households (based on expenditures from 23,553 unique households), across 52
consumption categories and specifically makes per capita GHG estimates for the top
2%. He estimates average per capita footprints of 53.5 tons CO2e for this group. He
also finds the share of embodied vs direct emissions increases with income;
accounting for 75% of emissions footprint for the highest 2% income group. Yet, this
2% income group is based on survey data that under-samples top income
households.
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Chancel and Piketty (55) use the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) IO
database and the Lakner-Milanovic dataset (56) that provides decile-level average
income/consumption. They estimate the top 1% of the U.S. income distribution is
responsible for 318 tons CO2e annually - 50 times the world average and 2,500
times the lowest global emitters. Yet, they are ultimately basing these CO2e
multipliers on estimated income of pre-aggregated decile groups and income to
CO2e elasticity estimated by other studies, using broad expenditure categories, not
detailed household level spending data. This lacks the precision of detailed bottom
up household-level estimates that assign emissions based on granular expenditure
categories and savings rates, before aggregating income groups. Because very top
income U.S. households have higher savings rates and purchase less CO2e intensity
goods and services than other groups, the elasticity values they employ will
overestimate U.S. top 1% household footprints.
In terms of producer-income or supplier-income responsibility, no prior work
at all has examined the distribution of GHG income benefits at the U.S. household
level. Nor have there been any shared / total responsibility studies at the U.S.
household level. Indeed, I am aware of no existing research, for any country, that
links households to the GHG emissions embodied in their income for producerincome, supplier-income, or total responsibility. Furthermore, to my knowledge, no
prior study has examined the racial inequality in U.S. consumption emissions under
any accounting framework. The lack of knowledge in how GHG responsibility is
distributed within U.S. society obscures the truth of who benefits and who is harmed
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by climate change and hinders effective policy development that reflects and
leverages this distribution of income and consumption benefits.

1.4 Research questions
To fill in these gaps I examine U.S. GHG emissions at a highly granular-level using
four accounting frameworks (consumer, producer-income, supplier-income, and
total responsibility) over a 20-year period (1996-2015). This is guided by the
following research questions:
1) Using a consumer-responsibility framework, what is the distribution of GHG
responsibility across U.S. households? What is the scale of inequality
between different economic and racial groups? Specifically, how do very top
income households compare to other economic groups within society? How
do the emissions responsibility of these groups compare to households in
other countries? And how do these GHG inequities, across economic groups,
vary across time?
2) Using a supplier-responsibility framework, what is the distribution of GHG
responsibility across U.S. households? What is the scale of inequality
between different economic and racial groups? Specifically, how do very top
income households compare to other economic groups within society? And
how do these GHG inequities, across economic groups, vary across time?
3) Using a producer-responsibility framework, what is the distribution of GHG
responsibility across U.S. households? What is the scale of inequality
between different economic and racial groups? Specifically, how do very top
9

income households compare to other economic groups within society? And
how do these GHG inequities, across economic groups, vary across time?
4) Using a total-responsibility framework that captures both consumption and
income benefits what is the distribution of GHG responsibility, across U.S.
households? What is the scale of inequality between different economic and
racial groups? Specifically, how do very top income households compare to
other economic groups within society? And how do these GHG inequities,
across economic groups, vary across time?
By examining U.S. households under these different accounting frameworks,
explicitly modeling top 1% households (and sub-groups within this), including race,
and conducting a time-series analysis my research gives an unprecedentedly clear
picture of how economic inequality, race, and GHG responsibility relate and how this
changes over time.

1.5 Methods
To conduct this research I pair an EE-MRIO (Fig. 1.2) with consumer
expenditure surveys, household income survey data, and additional income data for
very high-income households. The GHG intensity of goods and services and income
is calculated using the Eora MRIO database (57, 58); a highly granular IO model
covering 14,839 sectors, 190 countries, and 1,140 final demand and value added
categories. It has 2,720 environmental satellite accounts and 20 years of data tables.
Each year tracks about 100 million inter-sectoral interactions, for a total of about 2
billion interactions over the 1996-2015 period.
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Fig. 1.2: A simplified visual representation of a multi-region input output table
for a three-country world. Rows (dotted lines) are output from each industry
to intermediate or final demand, columns (dotted lines) are value added,
environmental, and intermediate inputs into each industry. Total output and
total input are equal (Based on Fig. 2.8 in (59))
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1.5.1 Environmentally-Extended Multi-Region Input-Output Model (EEMRIO)
IO modeling, including EE-MRIO, is grounded in the work of Wassily Leontief
(25) who formalized calculating the output of an economy as the sum of
intermediate (industry to industry transactions) and final demand
𝑥 = 𝐴𝑥 + 𝑦

(1)

In this matrix equation, where x is a vector of total output from each sector, A is a
technical coefficient matrix of the economy’s production function (the amount of
inputs received from each sector divided by total output of that sector), and y is a
vector of all final demand consumption for each sector.1 Using matrix notation this
is written as
𝐴!!
𝐴
𝐴 = !"
⋮
𝐴!!

𝐴!"
𝐴!!
⋮
𝐴!!

⋯
⋯
⋱
⋯

𝑥!
𝑦!
𝐴!!
𝑥!
𝑦!
𝐴!!
; 𝑥= ⋮ ; 𝑦= ⋮
⋮
𝑥!
𝑦!
𝐴!!

(2)

In matrix equation form it can be written as
𝑥 = 𝐼−𝐴

!!

𝑦

(3)

where I is an identity matrix and (I - A)-1 is the Leontief inverse matrix (L)2, which
captures all direct and indirect inputs used to create one unit of final demand
output.
Since (I - A)-1 = L, this can be simplified to

The vector y is the row sum of an m x n matrix, where rows m are all sectors of the global economy
and columns n are five categories of final demand (household consumption, non-profits serving
households, government final demand, gross fixed capital formation, and changes in inventories), for
each country.
2 For a comprehensive guide to input output analysis see: (61, 95, 106). For a basic introduction see
(107)
1
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𝑥 = 𝐿𝑦

(4)

An alternative to the Leontief demand-side model was proposed by Ambica Ghosh,
in 1958 (60, 61). In this supply-side model gross output is a function of primary
inputs, or a unit of value (i.e. value added) entering the economy. In matrix equation
form this is
𝑥′ = 𝑣′ 𝐼 − 𝐵

!!

(5)

where x is a vector of total output, ‘ denotes transposing, v is a vector of value
added3, I is an identity matrix, B is a direct output-coefficient matrix (output to each
industry divided by total output from that industry), and (I - B)-1 is the Ghosh
inverse matrix (G), which captures all direct and indirect inputs used to create one
unit of final demand output.

Matrix notation for B, v, and x, are written as
𝐵!!
!"
𝐵= 𝐵
⋮
𝐵!!

𝐵!"
𝐵!!
⋮
𝐵!!

⋯
⋯
⋱
⋯

𝐵!!
𝑣!
𝑥!
!!
!
!
𝐵
; 𝑣= 𝑣 ; 𝑥= 𝑥
⋮
⋮
⋮
𝐵!!
𝑣!
𝑥!

(6)

These can also be transposed to
𝑥 = 𝐵′𝑥 + 𝑣

(7)

and
𝑥 = 𝐼 − 𝐵′

!!

𝑣

(8)

or simply
𝑥 = 𝐺′𝑣

(9)

The vector v is the column sum of an m x n matrix, where rows m are five value added categories
(compensation of employees, taxes on production, subsidies on production, net operating surplus,
net mixed income), for each country, and columns n are all sectors of the global economy.
3
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The Ghosh Inverse (G) can also be directly computer from the Leontief inverse (L)
𝐺 = 𝑥 !! 𝐿𝑥

(10)

where ^ denoted a diagonal matrix.
1.5.2 Environmental Extensions
This monetary input-output analysis can be extended to environmental
applications by treating environmental inputs (e.g. raw materials) or outputs (e.g.
pollution) as an input to production. For example, GHG reporting allows for the
estimation of total mtCO2e directly emitted by each industry. These direct
emissions, f, are divided by output per industry to obtain mtCO2e per unit of output
𝑒 = 𝑓 × 𝑥 !!

(11)

where e is a vector of the direct environmental intensity, from each sector. The “∧”
above x indicates matrix diagonalization. Matrix inversion, -1, is used for division
with matrices. This direct intensity is then combined with v and G
𝑊 = 𝑣×𝐺×𝑒

(12)

which yields W a matrix of all direct and indirect CO2e emissions from each sector.
Summing W, we obtain the total mtCO2e emissions across the whole economy,
which equals the sum of f (direct emissions), but the emissions have now been
redistributed based on the supplier-income responsibility principle. Summing each
column of W gives the total supplier-based CO2e of each industry and summing each
row of W gives the direct producer-based emissions. Finally, by dividing elementwise W column sums by the column sum of total value added to that sector, v, we
obtain the mtCO2e per dollar of value added (also referred to as CO2e intensity).
14

The producer income responsibility is considerably simpler in formulation.
𝑃 = 𝑓 × 𝑣 !!

(13)

Here P is a vector of direct emissions intensity per dollar of value added, f is direct
emissions, and these are divided by value added (v). This yields mt CO2e per dollar
of value added, for the direct producer responsibility framework.

Finally, the original demand-side Leontief model has the form
Q= 𝑒×𝐿×𝑦

(14)

Where Q is a matrix of all direct and indirect CO2e emissions from each sector.
Summing Q yields the total mtCO2e emissions used across the whole economy,
which equals the sum of f (direct emissions), but the emissions have now been
redistributed based on the consumer-responsibility principle. Summing each
column of Q gives the total consumer-based CO2e of each industry, summing each
row of Q gives the direct producer-based emissions. Finally, by dividing elementwise Q column sums by the row sum of total final demand for that sector, y, we
obtain the mtCO2e per dollar of final demand purchase (also referred to as CO2e
intensity).
In theory, while each commodity or industry row of W, P and Q may be
different, based on the accounting principle used, summing each one should obtain
exactly the same value (here total global GHG emissions). In practice I found total
GHG estimates for W, the supply income model, were about 3% off from P (direct
producer) and Q (consumer responsibility). This is because total inputs in Eora are
15

not perfectly balanced with total outputs in Eora. However, at only 3% difference,
the effect here is reasonably small.
1.5.3 Pairing GHG intensity with household benefits
To calculate household consumption-based GHG footprints, the GHG
intensity of commodities (goods and services) are matched with individual
household purchases of those commodities. This is done using U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) Consumer Expenditure Surveys (CES), which reports detailed
household consumption data for a mostly representative U.S. national sample4 of
about 14,500 unique households (consumer units) each year. I extract 83
expenditure categories that capture about 90-95% of consumer expenditures (62).
In addition I extract 74 variables related to income, geographic location, and
demographics. Each year yields a matrix of ~1,200,000 expenditure data points and
~2,300,000 total data points, totaling about 46,000,000 points over the 20-years.
The GHG intensity of income is calculated by linking industry specific GHG
multipliers (generated via the Eora IO analysis) with individual-level income data.
Income data come from IPUMS CPS, a harmonized dataset drawn from the Census
Bureau’s Current Population Survey (63). It includes approximately 65,000 U.S.
households and about 189,000 individuals per year and reports the industry from
which income comes. From CPS, I extract 31 income categories, 3 retirement and
employer healthcare variables, and 11 social benefits and 44 other variables related

The CES under-samples high-income households. This is accounted for via a bootstrap and
estimation procedure. A detailed methodology is provided in the consumer-responsibility chapter.
4
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to individual or household characteristics. Each year yields 17,000,000 data points,
totaling about 350,000,000 data points across the 20-year period.
The total responsibility framework is calculated by first averaging the
supplier and producer income footprints then averaging this with consumer
footprints. This provides a total responsibility framework in which half a
household’s responsibility is linked to their source of income and the other half to
their consumption.
By quantifying the scale of GHG inequality across U.S. households, exploring
the racial and temporal trends in this, and examining households under different
responsibility frameworks I hope to reveal a previously unknown insight into U.S.
emissions, inform social narratives related to environmental and climate justice,
and highlight some policy opportunities these findings might impact. If we are to
achieve a stable climate it is critical to understand who is benefitting from GHG
emissions so that this group also bears a commensurate responsibility in an
effective policy response. My hope is that the research presented here will help
contribute to that effort.

1.6 Organization of the Dissertation
Chapter 1 introduced the motivation for this work, research questions, and
broad methods. Chapter 2 presents background, results, methods and policy
implications for U.S. household consumption-based footprints. Chapter 3 presents
background results, methods and policy implications for producer and supplier
income based U.S. household GHG footprints. Chapter 4 presents background,
17

results, methods and policy implications for a producer-supplier shared income
responsibility and a total responsibility (based 50% on consumption, 25% on
supplier-income, and 25% on producer income). Chapter 5 concludes the work by
discussing how the findings of Chapters 2-4 relate to each other and inform policy
formation. In addition it proposes future research directions and places this work in
a broader context.
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CHAPTER 2
2

CONSUMPTION-BASED U.S. HOUSEHOLD CARBON FOOTPRINTS

2.1 Abstract
Unsustainable environmental degradation and extreme economic inequality
are two of humanity’s most pressing challenges and they are intimately linked.
Climate changing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are disproportionately driven by
the consumption patterns of wealthy and socially privileged groups, yet poorer and
socially marginalized peoples face disproportionate climate harms. Here I quantify
GHG emissions related to the goods and services consumed by United States
households between 1996 and 2015. Results reveal significant GHG inequality
across economic class and racial lines. The top 1% of income earning households
captured 18.9% of national income and had emissions 14.8x (1,379%) higher than
bottom decile U.S. households and 218x (21,674%) higher than low-income country
households. White non-Hispanic household emissions were 42% higher than black
households. If climate policy does not account for such extreme emissions
disparities it will limit effectiveness, erode public support, and disproportionately
harm economic and socially marginalized groups.

2.2 Significance Statement
Over the last several decades, a growing share of U.S. national income has
flowed to the top 1% of households. At the same time, U.S. greenhouse gas emissions
are well above what is needed to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C. The link
19

between income and household-level emissions has previously been investigated,
but little work has been done to quantify emissions of those at the very top of the
income distribution; this group is of particular interest because it exerts
disproportionate political power in shaping climate policy. Here, I report 20 years of
U.S. emissions estimates for top income households. I find significant inequality and
a meaningful share of national emissions being driven by this small politically
powerful group.

2.3 Introduction
Even if the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) of the Paris Agreement
are realized, global annual greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, in 2030, are projected
to be 124% higher than what is needed to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C
(64). These emissions occur to provide goods, services, and wealth to people around
the world (65). Yet significant economic inequality, both within and between
countries, results in a powerful disconnect between the groups who reap these
benefits and those that are left to deal with the harms caused by excessive GHG
emissions, i.e., global climate change. Poorer and socially marginalized peoples tend
to be the most impacted by climate change and other environmental degradation
(66–72) yet environmental change is disproportionately driven by, and for the
benefit of, those with the most resources and social privilege (21, 28, 29, 32, 73, 74).
It is widely accepted as a basic principle of fairness that those benefiting from
an activity, like the GHG emissions that drive climate change, should bear some
responsibility in mitigating the damage caused by those activities. From the
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international community’s first attempt at collective climate action, the 1992 United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), through the 2015
Paris Agreement, this responsibility has been conceptualized as national-level
responsibility for emissions produced within a country’s territory. However, the
continued globalization of supply chains, since the UNFCCC, means that significant
emissions may occur in one country to create goods and services that are exported
around the globe. To account for this, an alternative consumer responsibility
framework has been developed over the last few decades (28–39). This calculates a
nation’s responsibility based on emissions that occur anywhere in the world to
produce the goods and services consumed within a country’s territory. Because
goods and services ultimately flow to people, this emissions responsibility can be
traced to the individual households who consume those goods and services.
Below, I present results from a highly granular time series analysis (19962015) of consumption-based U.S. household GHG emissions. For each year, I employ
a global multi-region input-output table to track the GHG emissions embodied in
10,211 commodities across 190 countries (> 100 million inter-sectoral transfers per
year) (see Materials and Methods). The embodied emissions in these goods and
services are tracked to final-demand household-level purchasing from a mostly
nationally representative5 sample of ~14,500 U.S. households per year.
Expenditures for top 1% and 0.1% households, which are under-sampled in the
underlying survey data, are also estimated (see Materials and Methods). Direct

Note, the underlying survey used in my analysis is considered “nationally representative”, but there
is a known undercount of high-income households. See Materials and Methods for how I address this.
5
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household emissions, such as vehicle fuel use and home heating, are also accounted
for. To reveal how income inequality relates to inequality in emissions footprints,
households are binned into income deciles, including a disaggregation of the top
decile into the top 1% (99.0th - 100th percentile), next 9% (90.0th - 99th percentile),
and a further disaggregation of the top 1% into the top 0.1% (99.9th - 100th
percentile) and next 0.9% (99.0th - 99.9th percentile) of income earners.

2.4 Results
2.4.1 Time Series: 1996-2015
From 1996 to 2015, national average household emissions declined 14%,
from 49.3 to 42.2 metric tons (mt) CO2e. All deciles show similar net declines (range:
-7% to -23%). However, when decile 10 is broken into the top 1% and next 9%, I
find the trends suddenly diverging (Fig. 2.1). The next 9%, like all the lower deciles,
also shows a net emissions decline (-14%), from 94.1 to 81.3 mt CO2e. Unlike the
lower 99% of households, the top 1% saw an increasing emissions trend (+19%)
from 216 to 256 mt CO2e.
When I further disaggregate the top 1% into the next 0.9% and the top 0.1%, I
find the next 0.9% emissions increased 8% in those 20 years (167 to 181 mt CO2e),
while top 0.1% households emissions rose 42% (658 to 937 mt CO2e). These net 20year rises in estimated household GHG footprint for the top 1%, next 0.9%, and top
0.1% households all stand in stark contrast to the decreasing footprints seen by the
bottom 99% of households.
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Indeed, apart from the consumption-based emissions of these very top
households, many emissions-related measures fell during this time: total U.S.
territorial producer emissions, national GHG per capita, per household, and per
dollar spent (Fig. 2.1). Total consumption-based emissions summed over all U.S.
households saw only a modest increase (+5%), in spite of a much larger increase in
the U.S. population (+19%) and expenditure dollars per capita (+15%). So why do
both subgroups in the top 1% of households buck these declining, or only modestly
increasing, emissions trends? One factor is the significant income growth that has
accrued to this group (Fig. 2.2). The next 0.9% saw income growth of 52%, from
$595,000 to $903,000. The top 0.1% saw average pre tax incomes rise 85% over 20
years, from $3.6 million to $6.7 million (in 2020 US$). Rising incomes result in more
dollars available to purchase the goods and services that drive GHG emissions, even
though the marginal propensity to consume tends to fall, at higher income levels
(75).
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Fig. 2.1: Mean household metric tons CO2e emissions (1996-2015) per income
decile, with Decile 10 broken into top 0.1%, top 1%, next 0.9% and next 9%.
Shading is standard error.
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Fig. 2.2: Percent changes (1996-2015) in income, population, spending, total
and average U.S. CO2e emissions, and CO2e intensity relative to 1996 base
year.
2.4.2 Most Recent Year (2015)
In 2015, the most recent year for which I have data, I estimate the top decile
had an average emissions footprint of 98.8 mt CO2e (median (x̃ ) = 76.1), and
collectively accounted for 23% of total U.S. emissions. Within decile 10, the next 9%
averaged 81.3 mt CO2e (x̃ = 74.1) and accounted for 17% of total U.S. emissions. Top
1% households averaged 255.9 mt CO2e (x̃ = 165.8, responsible for 6% of total U.S.
emissions) (Fig. 2.3); with next 0.9% averaging 180.6 mt CO2e (x̃ = 154.2, 3.8% of
U.S. emissions), and top 0.1% averaging 937.5 mt CO2e (x̃ = 567.2, 2.2% of total U.S.
emissions) (Fig. 2.4).
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Fig. 2.3: Mean household mt CO2e emissions (2015) per income decile, with
Decile 10 broken into top 1% and next 9%. The width of each income group,
on the x-axis, corresponds with each group’s share of total national CO2e
emissions. Colors represent the mt CO2e from each expenditure category,
based on mean contribution from each category, per income group. Note:
standard error bars are for each income group's mean footprint.
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Fig. 2.4: Mean household mt CO2e emissions (2015) per income decile, with
Decile 10 broken into top 0.1%, next 0.9% and next 9%. The width of each
income group, on the x-axis, corresponds with each group’s share of total
national CO2e emissions. Colors represent the mt CO2e from each expenditure
category, based on mean contribution from each category, per income group.
Note: standard error bars are for each income group's mean footprint.
The absolute difference in emissions, between groups, is stark. Yet by
normalizing each group’s share of national emissions by its population share, the
results reveal even more significant inequality. The bottom decile’s emissions are
60% lower per household, than if emissions were equitably distributed across all
U.S. households (Fig. 2.5). Similarly, deciles 2-6 accounts for a smaller emission
fraction than their share of total U.S. population. The top 1% has emissions 501%
(6x) higher than its population share and 1,379% (14.8x) larger than an average
bottom decile household. The top 0.1% has average emissions 2,099% (22x) higher
than its population share and 5,318% (54.2x) larger than an average bottom decile
household.
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Fig. 2.5: Emissions share relative to population share (% difference) for
deciles 1-9, next 9%, next 0.9% and top 0.1% (2015). A zero value on the y-axis
indicates an equitable distribution: i.e. the group’s share of national emissions
equals its population share. The width of each income group, on the x-axis,
corresponds with each group’s share of total national CO2e emissions. Note,
the negative emissions of deciles 1-6 and extreme inequality of the next 0.9
and top 0.1%.
Household footprints are critically shaped by the types of goods and services
purchased. In 2015, purchases from Transport and the Utility and Home Energy
categories accounted for 14.6% of expenditure dollars, from average top 1%
households (Fig. 2.6); yet contributed 36.7% to the household’s emissions footprint
(Fig. 2.7). Meanwhile, expenditures related to the Finance and Insurance (non28

health) and Home categories accounted for 53.0% of their expenditure dollars, but
only 37.6% of their emissions footprint. Households at a given expenditure level
may thus have very different footprints, based on the types of goods and services
purchased. Across groups, the CO2e intensity of low-income households tends to be
higher than upper income households (1.5x higher than the top 1%, see Fig. 6.5 in
Appendix A), as their consumption is dominated by carbon intensive necessities.

Fig. 2.6: Expenditure percent per expenditure category (2015).
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Fig. 2.7: Emissions percent per expenditure category (2015).

2.4.3 Relationship to Racial Inequality
The bottom income decile, which was responsible for 4% of U.S.
consumption-based emissions, in 2015, is 19% black (the highest share in any
decile), 14% Hispanic, and 58% white non-Hispanic (the lowest share in any decile).
The top decile, responsible for 23% of national emissions is 4% black (the lowest
share in any decile), 5% Hispanic, and 79% white non-Hispanic (the highest share in
any decile). Across all economic groups, black households had average footprints of
31.8 mt CO2e, white Hispanic households 35.2 mt CO2e, and white non-Hispanic
households 45.1 mt CO2e. The fact that white non-Hispanic households had
emissions 28% higher than Hispanic households and 42% higher than black
households reflects a striking degree of racial inequality in who receives the
consumption benefits of GHG emissions.
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2.4.4 Super Emitters
For 2015, I estimate 3.9% of the top 0.1% households had emissions over
3,000 mt CO2e (mean = 3,617, x̃ = 3,476) . Even though they make up only a tiny
fraction of households, are such high estimates feasible? To cross-check their
validity, I independently estimate per household emissions related to luxury goods
that are principally or only consumed by top 1% households (see SI for
methodology). This includes large mansions or multiple large homes, first class air
travel, private jets, and super yachts.
Construction of 40,000 square feet of living space (either in one large home
or multiple homes) emits ~1,688 mt CO2e. Yet, because these emissions are
amortized over an estimated 50 year home lifespan, annual emissions, from initial
construction, are only about 34 mt CO2e. Emissions related to electricity and utilities
add about 95 - 122 mt CO2e, per year, for 40,000 square feet of home.
Emissions from first class air travel add up to 100 mt CO2e or more for an
average sized family travelling on 3-5 long haul flights per year. I estimate annual
fuel-related emissions from private jets, whose ownership and use are concentrated
within extremely wealthy households, average about 1,172 mt CO2e per jet. On the
seas, I estimate average annual emissions from motorized superyachts (30+ meter)
to be about 1,150 mt CO2e per vessel. For both jets and super-yachts, individual
emissions can be even higher if the vessels are larger or used more frequently than
my estimates. While rare, adding these extreme luxury emissions together with
other expenditures, household GHG footprints of 3,000 (or more) mt CO2e per year,
are feasible.
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2.4.5 Global Comparison (2010)
While significant emissions inequality exists across U.S. households, even the
bottom U.S. decile has relatively high emissions when compared to other countries’
consumption-based emissions (Table 2.1) (76). The national average U.S. footprint
is 2.9x larger than the high-income country average and 32.6x larger than the lowincome country average. An average top 1% U.S. household has emissions 19.5x
larger than the high-income country average and 218x (21,674%) higher than the
low-income country average. At the extremes, the top 0.1% U.S. income group is
745x (74,509%) higher than an average household in a low-income country and an
average U.S. super emitter is 2,582x (258,155%) higher than the low-income country
average.

32

Table 2.1: Comparison (times larger) of mean household emissions, per U.S.
income group, including super emitters (2010), to per household national
averages for low, low-middle, high-middle, and high-income countries (global
estimates are 2010 from (76).
U.S. income groups
(times larger)
Global
income
groups

(mtCO2e)

Decile
1

Decile
5

National
househo
ld
average

Decile
10

Decile 10
next
9%

top
1%

top 1%
next
0.9%

top
0.1%

super
emitters

(15.9 mt) (38.3 mt) (47.3 mt) (121.9 mt) (100 mt) (316 mt) (233 mt) (1081 mt) (3747 mt)

Low
(1.5 mt)

11.0

26.4

32.6

84.0

68.9

217.7

160.8

745.1

2581.6

Lowmiddle
(4.4 mt)

3.6

8.6

10.6

27.4

22.5

71.1

52.5

243.3

843.0

Highmiddle
(8.9 mt)

1.8

4.3

5.3

13.7

11.3

35.5

26.3

121.6

421.5

High
(16.2 mt)

1.0

2.4

2.9

7.5

6.2

19.5

14.4

66.6

230.8

2.5 Discussion
2.5.1 Relationship of Emissions Inequality to Income Inequality
My results show significant emissions inequality within U.S. society. In 2015,
the bottom 50% of the population was responsible for 30.9% of national emissions,
while the top 10%, top 1%, and top 0.1% were respectively responsible for 23.2%,
6%, and 2.2% of national emissions. Yet, the income that enables consumptionbased emissions is even more inequitably distributed (77). In 2015, the bottom 50%
of the population captured just 12.9% of national income, while the top 10%, top
1%, and top 0.1% captured 45.7%, 18.9%, and 8.5% of national income (78).
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Emissions are less unequal than income because social welfare programs,
progressive taxation, and variable savings rates decouple income from expenditure.
Among low-income households, social welfare programs result in some households
having expenditures higher than incomes, thus increasing their GHG emissions per
dollar of income. Among high earning households, progressive taxation and high
savings rates results in less expenditures per dollar of income. Especially at very
high income levels, a high savings rate reflects the diminishing marginal propensity
to consume (75). Additionally, the types of goods and services purchased (Fig. 2.6)
and their respective GHG intensities (Fig. 2.7) vary across income groups. Lowincome decile spending is dominated by GHG intensive necessities while the top 1%
shifts spending to less GHG-intensive services, resulting in lower GHG intensity per
expenditure dollar (see Fig. 6.5 in Appendix A).
2.5.2 Factors shaping household footprints
Household footprints are directly determined by the types and quantity of
goods and services purchased. As my results show, these household expenditures
are strongly tied to household income. Yet even at a given income level, GHG
footprints vary due to differences in consumer preferences, geographic, social,
economic, and policy factors, cutting across scales (household, community, regional,
national, and global) over which individual households have varying degrees of
agency (79).
Among the lowest deciles, the ability to shift spending towards less GHGintensive goods is limited by expenditures principally flowing to carbon intensive
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basic necessities and limited access to savings or credit. In contrast, high-income
households have significant agency, discretionary spending, saving rates, wealth,
and credit that results in consequential emissions differences, even at a given
income level. Variations in these factors, particularly tax and savings rates, drive the
significant year to year GHG variation we see in top 0.1% households (Fig. 2.1).
Household agency is nested within community and regional factors such as
local climate, energy efficiency of available housing stock, and transportation and
energy infrastructure. The GHG intensity of regional electric grids is a key factor
shaping household footprints, and it is one over which they have extremely limited
agency. In 2015, the average CO2e intensity per dollar of electricity production from
the ten dirtiest states was 6.7 times higher than that of the ten cleanest states (80,
81). At the state and national-level, differences in tax policy, environmental
regulation and clean energy investment also play an important role in shaping
household level GHG variations, since they can encourage (or discourage) moves
toward less GHG intensity. Finally, the GHG intensity of internationally-produced
goods and services is nested within globalized supply chains, and here too,
individual consumers cannot exert much influence at all.
2.5.3 Policy Implications
Economists widely agree that carbon pricing, via either a carbon tax or capand-trade system, will be essential to decarbonize the US economy in a costeffective way (82, 83). Both carbon taxes and cap-and-trade have their own unique
features, but their ultimate effect is to price in some of the social costs of emissions.
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To successfully shift spending, however, it is estimated that the tax rate would need
to be set relatively high. For example, Heal and Schlenker (83) have calculated that
achieving a 5% impact on oil consumption would require the tax rate to be set at
$200 per ton CO2e, with 70-80% of this cost initially passed onto consumers.
For a top 1% household, a carbon tax of $200 per mt CO2e amounts to 3% of
pre-tax income (11% of expenditures). In contrast, for deciles 1-3, it equates to
53%, 26%, and 21% of their respective incomes (15-16% of expenditures)6. With
little discretionary spending or savings to draw on, low-income families would be
forced to make painful cutbacks when faced with such a tax, while middle-decile
households could pursue a mix of cutbacks and decreased savings. Meanwhile, highincome households enjoy significant savings rates (46% for top 1% and 57% for top
0.1% groups, in 2015) that allow them to simply absorb the tax. This raises a
significant equity concern that high-emitting wealthy families would be free to make
no meaningful lifestyle changes, while low-emitting poor families would face a
crushing burden.
To address this, any revenue generated from tax or emissions permit sales
could be used to reduce general sales tax or even make lump sum dividend
payments to households. This can make such price increases either cost neutral or
even of net benefit to low-income households (84–86). Yet if high-income
households largely absorb the tax, and low-income households see a net benefit, it
could have the result of boosting their expenditures (which are 47% more CO2e
The carbon tax as a share of expenditure is lower and more consistent across these groups, than as
a share of income, because social transfers result in expenditures that are higher than incomes and
average expenditures between groups are closer than their average incomes.
6
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intensive than top 1% households) and thus their GHG emissions. If such transfers
made the tax neutral for low-income families and the remainder flowed to clean
energy investment and credits or subsidies for low-income households, it may
successfully lead to emissions reductions. Yet, a significant political challenge with
any such proposal is that setting rates high enough to shift behavior may stimulate
public backlash. While a redistribution plan could increase public support, the highincome households that would pay the most tax are the same households whose
preferences dominate policy-making (53), potentially reducing their support for
such measures.
2.5.4 Equity, Climate and Environmental Justice
My results show significant emissions inequality, within U.S. society, that cuts
across economic class and race. They also show this inequality is even more
significant when compared to global income groups. In order to keep global
temperature within 1.5°C, only ~420 GT of additional CO2e (approximately 10 years
of global emissions at current rates) can still be added to the atmosphere (87).7 How
should these emissions be divided among the planet’s 7.8 billion inhabitants (and
future generations)?
The U.S. accounts for just 4% of the global population, but at current rates,
U.S. consumption-based emissions alone would use all of this budget by 2100, with,
as my results show, the wealthiest U.S. households capturing a disproportionate
share. At the same time, there are currently ~700 million people globally who live in
Note, this is a 66% probability of remaining within 1.5°C. The IPPC estimate was published in 2018,
I have updated it to 2020.
7
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extreme poverty (<$1.90 PPP per day). Moving this group to a very modest global
middle class8 (<$2.97 PPP - $8.44 PPP) would also use up the entire remaining CO2e
budget by 2100 (76, 88).
To which group should emissions be allocated? Setting aside for now the
thorny question of large disparities between nations’ historical emissions, one
equity-seeking approach might be to simultaneously set a global emissions target,
an individual emissions floor, and an individual emissions cap. The IPCC estimates
30 Gt CO2e is the upper 2030 limit to keep warming within 1.5°C. Using that as the
global emissions target, all people could be allocated a floor of at least 0.9 mt CO2e
and a cap of 8.7 mt CO2e (89). Currently, even the poorest U.S. decile’s emissions per
capita are 47% (1.5x) above the cap, while average top 1% and top 0.1% emissions
per capita are 945% (10.5x) and 3,734% (38x) higher.
These emissions disparities highlight the unequal allocation of consumption
benefits to higher income countries, and particularly to high-income households
within such countries. At the same time, the harms of climate change will fall
unequally on poorer nations and on poorer households in nearly every country (66,
69).
Humanity is thus faced with stark choices. Should emissions go to the poorest
to create a global middle class? Should they go to future generations? Or should they
go toward enabling the wealthiest to consume 10, 100, or >1,000 times more than
others? If it is to go to the richest, what compensation is owed to society? By

Note, this is the global middle class, which is well below middle class living standards in developed
countries. Global middle class is below the poverty line in a developed nation.
8
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quantifying the scale of this inequity, my findings help to inform such discussions
and provide the basis for improving policy design.

2.6 Materials and Methods
I combine an Environmentally-Extended Multi-Region Input-Output Model
(EE-MRIO) direct emissions data, consumer expenditure surveys (CES), and income
data to link global GHG emissions with the goods and services consumed by U.S.
households.
To calculate the embodied CO2e intensity of these goods and services, I use the
Eora MRIO database (57, 58) covering 14,839 sectors, across 190 countries, with
1,140 final demand and value added categories. For each year, I convert EORA from
a heterogeneous classification system to a square 10,211 sector commodity by
commodity input-output table, using the Industry Technology Assumption, and
convert current year dollars to constant 2020 US$. Direct production-based CO2e
emissions data, from the PRIMAPHIST database (available in Eora), for six Kyoto
GHG (90), are converted to embodied emissions per dollar of final demand using the
Leontief inverse (21, 25, 28–30, 38). This captures all direct and indirect CO2e
emissions, along the whole supply chain (> 100 million inter-sectoral transfers each
year), that were used to produce a dollar output to final demand.
Direct emissions by the consumer, most notably transportation fuels and
home heating and cooking fuels, were calculated based on CO2e emissions factors,
per physical unit of fuel (91) and price data per unit of fuel from the U.S. Energy
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Information Administration. Where available, regional or state level price
adjustments were made.
For each year, these supply chain and direct emissions factors are matched
with household-level expenditure data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
Consumer Expenditure Surveys (CES). The CES is a mostly representative U.S.
national sample of about 14,500 unique households (consumer units) each year,
capturing about 90-95% of consumer expenditures (62). From the full CES dataset, I
extract 83 detailed expenditure categories9 and 74 variables related to income,
geographic location, and demographics. Each year yields a matrix of ~1,200,000
expenditure data points and ~2,300,000 total data points.
Prior to 2008, electricity and direct energy use CO2e intensities per dollar
were regionally adjusted, as data allowed, but no regional price adjustments data
were available for other expenditure categories. For 2008 onward, all expenditure
categories are regionally adjusted using the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
Price Parity by Portion (PARPP). For each household, this makes region-specific
price adjustments based on type of expenditure, state, and urban or rural status. For
electricity expenditures, the national CO2e intensities are replaced with state-level
multipliers that reflect the CO2e intensity of the local electric grid, in the relevant
year (80, 81).
While CES is the most authoritative source on U.S. household expenditures, it
has a known underreporting bias from high-income households (92, 93). To account
for this, I create a synthetic dataset for the next 0.9% and top 0.1% households and
9

These are compiled from several hundred lower level expenditure categories
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estimate their expenditures. I do this by first creating a distribution of 1,000
households, per group, whose mean pre-tax income and upper and lower bounds
matches that reported by the World Inequality Database (WID), and whose
distribution is right-skewed to reflect the income inequality within these groups. I
then subtract estimated tax and savings rates, with the difference considered
expenditure dollars. To allocate spending across the expenditure categories, I
bootstrap CES households that meet the top 1% WID threshold. I then apply a
randomization algorithm, to simulate household spending differences, that
calculates each household’s percent of expenditure, per category, while allowing
each expenditure category to vary +/- 50%, from the original bootstrapped value. At
the same time, each household’s total expenditures are constrained to a sum of
100%. Finally, these estimated percentages, per category, are multiplied by the
synthetic dataset’s expenditure dollars. This yields dollars, per expenditure category
estimates, for next 0.9% and top 0.1% groups. Top 1% CO2 estimates come from a
weighted average of the next 0.9% and top 0.1% groups.
For each household, purchases from each of the 83 CES goods and service
sectors are linked to the mt CO2e per dollar final demand of that sector, from Eora.
This is done via a 10,211 x 83 concordance matrix, using the International Standard
Industrial Classification (ISIC) system. Multiplying each household’s expenditures
by this concordance matrix yields emissions per expenditure category. Summing
across all categories and adding direct emissions, yields each household’s total
consumption-based mt CO2e footprint (see SI for more detailed methods, treatment
of durable goods, and crosscheck of super-emitter households).
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CHAPTER 3
3

INCOME-BASED U.S. HOUSEHOLD CARBON FOOTPRINTS

3.1 Abstract
Since 1996, the share of national income flowing to the top 1% of United States
(U.S.) households has increased about a quarter, to over 18% today. At the same
time, U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions remain far above what is possible if
humanity is to restrict global temperature rise to 1.5°C. In this chapter I combine
environmentally-extended multi-region input-output analysis with nationally
representative household surveys and top income group data to examine the GHG
emissions responsibility of U.S. households based on the emissions used to generate
their income. I do this at high granularity, over the 20-year period 1996-2015, and
compare emissions responsibility across income groups. As in Chapter 2, I find
significant inequality across groups, with the bottom 50% of households
responsible for only 15-24% of national income-based emissions (depending on
framework) while the politically powerful top 1% of U.S. households is responsible
for 11-16%. These results suggest an alternative income-based carbon tax (on wage
or investment income) may have equity advantages over traditional consumerfacing cap-and-trade or carbon tax options.

3.2 Significance Statement
Prior work has examined the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of nations
based on different responsibility principals including: supplier, producer, and
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consumer. These have respectively linked GHG emissions to the income it generates
and the consumption it enables. While consumption-based footprints have been
traced to the household-level, no prior analysis has extended income-based GHG
responsibility to households. This misses a critical connection between GHG
emissions and the flow of economic benefits. Here, for the first time, I link 20 years
of U.S. household-level income data to the GHG emissions that occurred to generate
that income, using both supplier and producer responsibility frameworks. I find vast
inequality across households and a significant share of national emissions being
driven by top income households.

3.3 Introduction
Over the last decade, the average global average temperature was the warmest
10-year period on record and trends in the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions driving
such warming remain stubbornly above Paris Agreement targets (64, 94). At the
same time, extreme economic inequality, across and within societies, results in a
powerful disconnect between those who reap the economic or consumption benefits
these GHG enable and those who face the worst impacts of climate change. Putting
aside intergenerational equity, this present day disconnect creates a fundamental
challenge to effective and equitable policy development, as those most benefitting
from GHG emissions also tend to have the most economic and political power while
those most at risk of climate harms tend to have the least.
No country on earth has emitted more climate altering greenhouse gases
(GHG) or reaped more economic benefit, from the cheap energy driving these
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emissions, than the United States (U.S.). It is the largest historical GHG emitter,
currently the second largest territorial emitter and has some of the highest per
capita incomes and consumption on the planet. At the same time, the U.S. has
significant economic inequality, with the top 10% of income earners capturing 46%
of national income, in 2019, and the top 1% alone capturing 19% (78). This top
income group is not only richer, but also whiter, more educated, and more
economically, socially, and politically powerful than any other group in the country.
It is the preferences of this group that shape public policy, including climate action
(53). Because, prior work linking U.S. households to their consumption or incomebased GHG emissions has focused on decile or national-level analysis the GHG
emissions responsibility of these politically powerful households have until now
been obscured. Here I analyze the income-based GHG emissions of U.S households,
including the top 1%, over a 20-year period (1996-2015).
Our income-based approach (40–46) has two distinct accounting regimens:
direct-producer emitter and supplier and calculates both pre-tax and post-tax GHG
responsibility. In the direct-producer emitter approach, households drawing an
income from an industry (through wages or return on investment) are held
responsible for a share10 of that industry’s direct operational emissions (Scope 1).11
In the supplier approach, households receiving an income (wages or return on

In both accounting schemes the units are metric tons (mt) CO2e per dollar of income. Each
household’s share of responsibility is commensurate with their share of income out of total value
added (compensation of employees, taxes, subsidies, net operating surplus, and net mixed income) of
that industry.
11 This is similar to current international climate agreements, like Paris, in that emissions are direct
emissions from an industry, but distinct in that I link these emissions to income that flows to
individual households, rather than assigning responsibility at the national or industry-level.
10
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investment) from an industry are responsible for a share of the total downstream
emissions enabled by that industry’s activities. To make this concrete, in a direct
approach, income from a fossil fuel extraction company is linked to that company’s
direct operational emissions, whereas in a supplier approach, income is linked to the
downstream emissions generated when that fossil fuel is ultimately combusted by
other industries.
Here I present results for a highly granular time series analysis (1996-2015)
that links global GHG emissions to both the direct and supplier based income
responsibility of U.S. households. In both responsibility frameworks, global GHG
emissions intensity per dollar of income are calculated for 9,812 industries across
190 countries (~ 96 million inter-sectoral transfers per year) using the Eora multiregion input-output (MRIO) model (see Methods) (57, 58). Using the nationally
representative IPUMS harmonized Current Population Survey (CPS), I link these
direct and supplier emissions intensities with industry-specific income received by
individuals (annual mean = ~189,000), then aggregate individual emissions into
households (annual mean = ~65,000). Households are binned into income groups
including the next 9% (90 - 99.0th percentile), top 1% (99.0th - 100th percentile),
next 0.9% (99.0th - 99.9th percentile), and top 0.1% (99.9th - 100th percentile) and
emissions are compared (see Methods for how I estimate top 1% households, which
are under sampled in CPS).
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3.4 Results
3.4.1 Time Series: 1996-2015
3.4.1.1 Supplier Income: Pre- and Post-tax
In the supplier income responsibility framework, national average household
emissions declined 19% (41.5 – 33.7 mt CO2e), pre-tax, between 1996 and 2015,
and 18% (35.1 to 29.0 mt CO2e) post-tax. Pre-tax, deciles 1-10 all fell between 9%
and 38%. But within this top decile, while the next 9% decreased 16%, the top 1%
increased 7% (477 - 510 mt CO2e), the next 0.9% remained essentially flat at -1%
(320 - 316 mt CO2e) and the top 0.1% increased 19% (1,888 – 2,254 mt CO2e) (Fig.
3.1(A)). Post-tax, all deciles declined 7-26%, with the next 9% declining 16%, the top
1% seeing an almost flat 2% decline (335 - 328 mt CO2e), the next 0.9% declining
9% (226 - 206 mt CO2e), and the top 0.1% increasing 9% (1,319 – 1,434 mt CO2e)
(Fig. 3.1(C)).
3.4.1.2 Producer Income: Pre- and Post-tax
Under the producer income framework, national average household
emissions declined 16% (pre-tax) and 12% (post-tax), over the 20-year period, from
47.2 to 39.9 metric tons (mt) CO2e pre-tax and 39.9 to 35.0 mt CO2e post-tax. Pre-tax
deciles’ 1-9 all fell between 22% and 33% and decile 10 declined 3% (Fig. 3.1(B)).
The next 9% decreased 16% and the top 1% increased 26% (498 to 626 mt CO2e).
Within this group, the next 0.9% increased 13% (335 - 379 mt CO2e) and the top
0.1% increased 45% (1,966 – 2,849 mt CO2e). Post-tax, deciles’ 1 and 2 show a slight
increase (8-10%), while declies’ 3-10 all show declines between 3-24%. Here, the
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next 9% decreased 16%, the top 1% increased 15% (351 to 403 mt CO2e), the next
0.9% increased 4% (237 - 247 mt CO2e), and the top 0.1% increased 32% (1,374 –
1,811 mt CO2e) (Fig. 3.1 (D)).

Fig. 3.1: Income-based mean household mt CO2e emissions (1996-2015) per
income group under the Supplier pre-tax (A), post-tax (C) and Producer pretax (B) and post-tax (C) accounting methods. Colored shading is standard
error, gray box shading indicates recession, vertical dashed lines (2001-2003)
and dotted line (2013) respectively indicate tax cuts and tax increase for the
highest tax bracket.
3.4.2 Income, Population and Emissions Trends
The U.S. population grew 19% during this 20-year period and dollars per
household12 increased 26% (Fig. 3.2). At the same time that the nation’s population
and wealth increased, its total national Supplier and Producer emissions,
12

All dollar units, in this paper, are inflation adjusted from current year to constant 2020 dollars.
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respectively fell 15% and 5%. With both frameworks, per household emissions fell
between 12-18% and GHG intensity (mt CO2e per dollar) fell 30-34%, likely
reflecting the effect of technological efficiency gains in the broader U.S. economy and
the gradual decrease in GHG intensity of the U.S. energy sector. Yet, income flowing
to the top 1% of households increased significantly, 52% for the next 0.9% group
(from $595,000 to $903,000) and 85% (from $3.6 million to $6.7 million) for the top
0.1%. This income growth outpaced the declining GHG intensity per dollar and helps
explain why, unlike the bottom 99% of the population, top 1% households saw
increasing income-based emissions footprints between 1996 and 2015.

Fig. 3.2: Percent changes (1996-2015) in income, population, spending, total
and average U.S. CO2e emissions, and CO2e intensity for both Producer and
Supplier frameworks (post-tax), relative to 1996 base year.
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3.4.3 Most Recent Year (2015)
3.4.3.1 Supplier Income
Pre-tax, the top decile, in 2015, was responsible for 41% of U.S. emissions
(mean (x̅ ) = 135.4 mt CO2e, (median (x̃ ) = 86.6) (Fig. 3.3(A)). The top 1% averaged
510 mt CO2e (x̃ = 306) and accounted for 15% of national emissions. With the next
0.9% driving 9% of emissions (x̅ = 316, x̃ = 291 mt CO2e) and the top 0.1% alone was
responsible for 7% of emissions, with a significant 2,254 mt CO2e average footprint
(x̃ = 1,990). By comparison, the bottom 50% of households were responsible for less
than 15% of national emissions. Post-tax, the bottom 50% increased its share to
23% of national emission. The top decile was responsible for 33% of emissions (x̅ =
95.7, x̃ = 65.2 mt CO2e), the top 1% drove 11% of national emissions (x̅ = 329, x̃ =
202 mt CO2e), the next 0.9% was responsible for 6% of emissions (x̅ = 205, x̃ = 192
mt CO2e), and the top 0.1% was responsible for 5% (x̅ = 1,299, x̃ = 711 mt CO2e) (Fig.
3.3(C)).
3.4.3.2 Producer Income
Producer-based income results for 2015 are generally similar, with the pretax top decile responsible for 40% of U.S. emissions (x̅ = 157.1 mt CO2e, x̃ = 94.8)
(Fig. 3.3(B)). The top 1% accounted for 16% of national emissions (x̅ = 626 mt CO2e,
x̃ = 360). The next 0.9% bore responsibility for 9%, (x̅ = 379, x̃ = 342 mt CO2e). While
the top 0.1% bore responsibility for 7% of emissions, averaging 2,849 mt CO2e (x̃ =
2,481). Similar to the pre-tax supplier emissions responsibility, the bottom 5 deciles
account for just under 15% of national emissions. Post-tax the bottom 50%
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increased their share to 24% and the top decile dropped to 32% (x̅ = 111.2, x̃ = 72.7
mt CO2e). The top 1% drove 12% of national emissions (x̅ = 403, x̃ = 238 mt CO2e),
the next 0.9% drove 6% (x̅ = 247, x̃ = 227 mt CO2e) and the top 0.1% was responsible
for 5% (x̅ = 1,811, x̃ = 1,624 mt CO2e) (Fig. 3.3(D)).

Fig. 3.3: Mean household mt CO2e emissions (2015) per income group under
the Supplier pre-tax (A), post-tax (C) and Producer pre-tax (C) and post-tax
(D) frameworks. The width of each income group, on the x-axis, corresponds
with each group’s share of total national CO2e emissions. Color indicates
income category and bars are standard error.
With both accounting methods and for pre-tax and post-tax there are stark
differences between income groups; with those at the very top responsible for large
absolute values (mt CO2e) and driving a significant share of national emissions. But
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by normalizing each group’s share of national emissions by its population share, I
produce an even clearer picture of inequality across groups. In a supplier income
framework the bottom decile’s emissions are 96% lower per household (pre-tax,
73% post-tax), than if emissions were equitably distributed across all U.S.
households (Fig. 3.4). Deciles 2-7 also account for a smaller emission fraction than
their population share. Pre-tax the top 1% has emissions 1,428% (15.3x) higher
than its population share and 38,791% (389x) larger than an average bottom decile
household. The top 0.1% has average emissions 6,657% (68x) higher than its
population share and 171,800% (1,719x) larger than an average bottom decile
household. The producer responsibility framework shows similar trends with the
first 7 deciles all negative and the top 1% and 0.1% having emissions 1,490%
(15.9x) and 7,134% (72.3x) larger than their population share and 39,300% (394x)
and 179,300% (1,794x) higher than bottom decile households (Fig. 3.5). Indeed, in
both frameworks the differences between deciles 1-8 are almost indistinguishable
due to the extreme inequality at the very top.
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Fig. 3.4: Supplier income emissions share relative to population share (%
difference) for deciles 1-9, next 9%, next 0.9% and top 0.1% (2015). A zero
value on the y-axis indicates an equitable distribution: i.e. the group’s share of
national emissions equals its population share. The width of each income
group, on the x-axis, corresponds with each group’s share of total national
CO2e emissions. Note, the negative emissions of deciles 1-6 and extreme
inequality of the next 0.9 and top 0.1%.
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Fig. 3.5: Producer income emissions share relative to population share (%
difference) for deciles 1-9, next 9%, next 0.9% and top 0.1% (2015). A zero
value on the y-axis indicates an equitable distribution: i.e. the group’s share of
national emissions equals its population share. The width of each income
group, on the x-axis, corresponds with each group’s share of total national
CO2e emissions. Note, the negative emissions of deciles 1-6 and extreme
inequality of the next 0.9 and top 0.1%.
Post-tax the emissions distribution becomes more equitable as taxes reduce
top income group footprints and social transfers increase lower decile footprints
(Fig. 3.6). Indeed, social transfers make up a significant share of lower income
groups post-tax footprint, while the top income group’s emissions footprint is
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dominated by capital gains and compensation (Fig. 3.7) (Fig. 3.8). But in both
supplier and producer methods the top 0.1% emissions’ share is still 49x-51x larger
than its population share and 171x-185x larger than bottom decile household
average emissions.

Fig. 3.6: Supplier income, percent change from pre-tax to post-tax footprints
(2015). Note, that deciles’ 1-6 increase their footprint, while those in decile 7
and above decrease. Producer income has a similar trend.
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Fig. 3.7: Supplier responsibility-based share of emissions from each income
category, by income group (2015).

Fig. 3.8: Producer responsibility-based share of emissions from each income
category, by income group (2015).
Regardless of framework, household footprints are sensitive to the income
source, but the GHG intensity of income source also does vary between accounting
55

methods. In a supplier income framework, mining and quarrying has the largest
carbon intensity per dollar (Fig. 3.9), since here they are responsible for emissions
that occur when the fossil fuels they supply are combusted. Whereas in the producer
framework, manufacturing, which is a heavy user of fossil fuels, has the highest GHG
intensity, while mining and quarrying (which includes fossil fuel extraction) ranks
relatively modestly, since their operational emissions are lower than others (Fig.
3.10).

Fig. 3.9: Supplier income, CO2e intensity per $1,000 income, by industry
(2015). Blue diamond denotes mean.
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Fig. 3.10: Producer income, CO2e intensity per $1,000 income, by industry
(2015). Blue diamonds denote mean.

3.4.3.3 Relationship to Racial Inequality
Across all economic groups, black households had average pre-tax footprints
of 21.0 mt CO2e (supplier) and 30.2 mt CO2e (producer), white Hispanic households
25.5 mt CO2e (supplier) and 27.5 mt CO2e (supplier), and white non-Hispanic
households 38.0 mt CO2e (supplier) and 44.3 mt CO2e (producer). There is a striking
degree of racial inequality in how the income benefits of GHG emissions are
distributed, as white non-Hispanic households emissions were 49% (supplier) and
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47% (producer) higher than white Hispanic households and 81% (supplier) and
63% (producer) higher than black households. Post-tax the racial emissions gap
closes somewhat, but white households still have emissions 30-55% higher than
other groups.
This emissions inequality reflects the extreme racial inequity of the
underlying income distribution. The top 1% is 79% white non-Hispanic (the highest
share of any income group), 8% Hispanic, and only 3% black (the lowest share of
any income group). The bottom decile is 46% white non-Hispanic (the lowest share
of any decile), 16% Hispanic, and 27% black (the highest share of any decile).
3.4.3.4 Super Emitters
I estimate about 25% of the top 0.1% households have pre-tax income
responsibility emissions over 3,000 mt CO2e with the supplier framework and about
37% with the producer framework. These super emitters average 3,942 mt CO2e (x̃
= 3,780) with supplier income and 4,497 mt CO2e (x̃ = 4,152) with producer income
accounting. Post-tax, this drops to 3% for supplier-based accounting with a mean of
3,427 mt CO2e (x̃ = 3,352) and 10% for producer-based accounting with a mean of
3,831 mt CO2e (x̃ = 3,658).

3.5 Discussion
3.5.1 Relationship of Emissions Inequality to Income Inequality
Income-based emissions responsibility closely correlates with income
inequality. In 2015, the bottom 50% of the population captured just 12.9% of pretax national income, while the top 10%, top 1%, and top 0.1% captured 46%, 19%,
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and 8.5% of national income (78). In terms of income-based emissions (pre-tax),
these same groups were respectively responsible for 41%, 15%, and 6.7% of U.S.
supplier-based emissions and 40%, 16%, and 7.2% of U.S. national producer-based
emissions. Post-tax and social transfers income-based emissions begin to slightly
decouple from earned income, with the top decile and top 1% seeing a reduction in
their share of national emissions and the lowest deciles seeing an increase. This
reflects the power of tax policy to transfer economic benefits, and the emissions
embodied in those benefits, between households.
3.5.2 Factors shaping household footprints
With consumption-based GHG emissions accounting, a household’s income is
not their GHG emissions destiny; meaning households have some agency over how
they spend their income. For example, they can choose to purchase less GHG
intensive goods and services. This agency increases with wealth. With income-based
accounting approaches, a household’s footprint is a direct result of their income and
they have extremely limited agency in shaping it. Here a household’s pre-tax
footprint is a function of GHG intensity of the industry/ies they work for and the
amount of income they earn. While individuals and households have some agency in
choosing which industry to seek employment or invest in, which leads to variability
in footprints at a given income level (Fig. 3.11), they generally have extremely
limited individual agency in influencing that industry’s GHG intensity, though they
may have some agency to influence their individual firm.
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Fig. 3.11: Relationship between income and household GHG footprint (log-log)
using the pre-tax supplier income method (2015). Supplier income has a
similar trend.
For low-income households, including the value of employer provided
healthcare, government assistance (such as healthcare, housing, tax credits, food, or
heating assistance) and direct social transfers (such as monetary gifts, education,
child support, or alimony) in income-based footprints increase their responsibility.
At the top of the income distribution, taxes significantly reduce household
footprints: about 35% for top 1%.
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Individual households are also sensitive to the accounting method choice. For
example, households working for an oil company will have a higher GHG footprint
when using the supplier accounting method than they would with the producer
accounting method. In 2015, the producer method also generates a higher absolute
GHG estimate per income group, than the supplier method (Fig. 3.12). This averages
19% across income groups, and varies between 11%-21% within income groups.13

Fig. 3.12: Comparing pre-tax mean household GHG footprints from supplier
and producer frameworks (2015).

Note, the 19% difference observed in 2015 is higher than the average difference in other years
(Fig. 3.1).
13
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3.5.3 Policy Implications
There is general agreement among economists that carbon pricing, either
through cap-and-trade or a carbon tax, are an essential and cost effective way to
help decarbonize the US economy (82, 83). Prior work has shown a carbon tax could
help phase out coal at a fairly low cost, but would need to be quite high, >$200 per
ton CO2e, to achieve even a 5% reduction in oil consumption. About 70-80% of this
cost would be initially passed onto consumers (83). My work on consumption-based
footprints highlights how a tax this high could be crushing to low-income families,
who purchase more GHG intensive basic necessities, but have small absolute GHG
footprints. In contrast, high-income households purchase less GHG intensive goods
and services but have extremely high absolute emissions footprints. High savings
rates, among this group, will allow them to simply absorb any tax increases and
continue driving significant emissions.
The fact that income-based footprints are more inequitable than
consumption-based footprints highlights a possible alternative approach to carbon
pricing schemes that could be more equitable. Instead of taxing companies that pass
on these costs to consumers, an income-based carbon tax, determined by the GHG
intensity of the industry from which the income is earned, could be applied to wage
earners and investors. While this too would impact low-income families, it would
impact them less than a consumption-based tax, because income is more inequitable
than consumption. Additionally, households below a given income threshold could
be excluded, or graduated tax credits could be granted, to address equity concerns
for low-income families.
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Such a tax could be based on the producer income or supplier income
principal, or some allocation that splits responsibility between the two. For
example, calculating the GHG intensity tax by averaging both methods for an even
50/50 split. Revenue, from this tax, could be used to fund mitigation and adaptation
efforts.
A significant complication with such an approach is in calculating the
emissions responsibility of an individual business. For large fossil fuel suppliers and
industrial facilities the GHG data requirement would be the same as in a traditional
cap-and-trade or carbon tax scheme and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program (GHGRP) already collects relevant data,
capturing about 85-90% of domestic emissions. Wage and investment income from
those industries is already reported to the Internal Revenue Service by employers
and financial institutions, so the data needed to link income source and industry is
already being collected. A direct producer income tax would be based on direct
emissions from industrial facilities. In a supplier responsibility framework, if all
responsibility were to be assigned directly to the supplier of fossil fuels, this existing
data could also be used to calculate the commensurate tax responsibility. Though for
smaller firms, not captured by GHGRP, the producer and supplier emissions
responsibilities would be missed.
Alternatively, instead of taxing wage income, this tax could just be applied to
investment income or as a shareholder tax. Because investment income and stock
and bond ownership is even more inequitable than wage income, this would help
focus the tax on those at the very top of the income distribution who reap the most
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economic benefit from GHG emissions. This could be applied as a tax at time of share
sale, or an annual tax applied to ownership of shares. The latter would be a form of
wealth tax, which has gained traction in recent years in progressive policy circles.
Focusing on the embodied emissions in certain types of wealth (i.e. stock or bond
ownership in fossil fuel intensive industries) may provide additional rationale for
such a tax.
One advantage to a wealth-based tax is that unlike an income-based tax it
does not come as a huge financial burden in one year. While there is some overlap of
households in the top 1% or 0.1% of income earners and the top 1% or 0.1% of
wealth holders there is far more annual churn among the top income group, as
households may see huge profits one year from the sale of a business, but far less
income in subsequent years. An income-based tax that affects households with a
heavy tax in one year may be less desirable than having a wealth-based tax that is
lower, but more stable year to year. Because wealth is even more inequitably
distributed than income, it is also a more effective tool to address systemic
inequality and capture the GHG emissions in unrealized capital gains. To make this
income versus wealth distinction concrete, in 2019, top 1% and 0.1% income
earners respectively had entry thresholds of $510,000 and $2.4 million, averaged
$1.4 and $6.4 million, and captured 19% and 8% of national income. Meanwhile, top
1% and 0.1% wealth holders respectively had entry thresholds of $4.2 and $17.8
million, averaged $13.7 and $70 million, and captured 35% and 18% of national
wealth.
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Whether the tax is applied at time of sale or annually, based on ownership,
both approaches would also have a beneficial secondary effect in spurring fiduciary
fund managers to divest from GHG intensive industries. Such a tax could again be
targeted to supplier or direct emitter companies, using the same GHGRP data. Large
and particularly publicly traded companies would be the easiest to apply the tax to,
but the challenge here is applying it to private and smaller companies.
Under any such plan a key challenge will be that the households that would
see the most direct effect of such an income or shareholder tax are also the
households who dominate policy making. Indeed they are the only group whose
preferences determine policy outcomes (53). Convincing this group to support such
a tax is a significant hurdle. Additionally workers in industries that would directly
feel the effects of such a tax would also likely fight such a measure. Though focusing
solely on investment income may help galvanize broad public support.
3.5.4 Equity, Climate and Environmental Justice
Climate change is an existential threat to humanity and the natural world. Its
effects (deadly heat waves, sea level rise, exacerbated wildfires, flooding, drought,
extinction) are already being felt today and will worsen throughout this century.
These effects will be broadly felt by current and future generations, but will largely
fall hardest on the poorest countries and poor, socially, and racially marginalized
communities within countries. Meanwhile, the benefits made possible by GHG
emissions (wealth and the goods and services that wealth can purchase) are
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concentrated heavily in the present14 and are disproportionately captured by
wealthy countries and wealthy, socially, and racially favored groups within
countries.
It is a basic principle of fairness that those responsible for harm bear a
commensurate responsibility to repair that harm. As GHG emissions create income,
those reaping this income have a responsibility to address the harm caused by the
emissions used to produce it. In the U.S., income is extremely inequitably
distributed, with those at the very top capturing income and driving emissions
>1,000x more than those at the bottom. Because of this inequitable distribution,
these highest earning households also have a disproportionate responsibility in
repairing emissions damage. Here, public policy, such as income or shareholder
carbon tax, can ensure that those benefiting the most from GHG emissions are
contributing equitably to the climate mitigation and adaptation efforts needed to
ensure the human and natural world can flourish in the future.

3.6 Materials and Methods
For both the producer and supplier approach I link income to GHG emissions
using an Environmentally-Extended Multi-Region Input-Output Model (EE-MRIO).
The GHG intensity per dollar of income, for each industry, is calculated and
multiplied by an individual’s income from that industry. The GHG intensities of
benefits and social transfers are also accounted for and the emissions responsibility

Intergenerational fortunes and assets that passed onto future generations do provide some benefit
to the future. Though these are heavily concentrated in wealthy households.
14
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of taxes are subtracted. Individuals are aggregated into households and households
are ranked into percentiles and deciles for income group comparisons.
To calculate the embodied CO2e intensity of income, I use the Eora MRIO
database (57, 58) covering 14,839 sectors, 190 countries, and 1,140 final demand
and value added categories. For each of the 20 years, EORA is converted from a
14,839 x 14,839 heterogeneous classification system to a square 9,812 x 9,812
industry by industry input-output table, using the Fixed Product Sales Structure
assumption (95). Current year dollars are adjusted to constant 2020 US$. Emissions
data, from the PRIMAPHIST database (available in Eora), capturing the six Kyoto
GHG (90), are used for both income accounting methods. In a producer income
approach the direct emissions of each industry are divided by that industry’s value
added inputs (which includes compensation of employees). This yields direct
emissions in mt CO2e per dollar value added. In the supplier income emissions
framework I calculate the enabled emissions, in mt CO2e e per dollar value, using the
Ghosh inverse. This captures all direct and indirect CO2e emissions, along the whole
downstream global supply chain (~ 100 million inter-sectoral transfers each year)
that were enabled in order to produce a dollar of value added.
For each year, these supply chain and direct emissions factors are matched
with individual-level IPUMS CPS income data. This is done by first applying a
concordance matrix to convert emissions factors from the 429 U.S. industries in
Eora to the 246 U.S. industries reported by CPS, using International Standard
Industrial Classification (ISIC) system coding. Individual-level wage data in CPS,
includes both the amount (in dollars) and the industry from which income is earned.
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Individual-level wage data are then multiplied by the corresponding CO2e intensity
for that industry. Other forms of income such as capital gains, interest, dividends,
retirement pensions or social security, and the value of employer healthcare
contributions are also accounted for. Here, when the source of income is not from an
employer, CO2e multipliers are based on the average emissions intensity of the U.S.
economy. The income value of employer healthcare contributions is based on the
employing industry CO2e multiplier. After multiplying by the corresponding CO2e
intensity, individuals are merged into their respective households and mt CO2e are
summed. This yields the pre-tax emissions footprint of each household.
To calculate the post-tax footprint, the value of social transfers such as
monetary gifts and publically provided benefits such as veterans benefits,
unemployment, heating, rental, educational assistance and others are also included.
CO2e multipliers are based on the average emissions intensity of the U.S. economy.
Finally, post-tax footprints are reduced by the percent paid in taxes.
To do this I use IPUMS CPS, a harmonized dataset drawn from the Census
Bureau’s Current Population Survey (63). It includes approximately 65,000 U.S.
households and about 189,000 individuals per year. From CPS, I extract 31 income
categories, 3 retirement and employer healthcare variables, and 11 social benefits
and 44 other variables related to individual or household characteristics. Each year
yields 17,000,000 data points, totaling about 350,000,000 data points across the 20year period.
While CPS is the most authoritative source on U.S. household income, top
coding and sampling challenges with top income households limit its accuracy for
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those at the very top of the income distribution. To address this, I create an oversampled synthetic dataset for the next 0.9% and top 0.1% households and estimate
their income. This is done by creating a distribution of 1,000 households, for each of
these groups. Mean pre-tax income and upper and lower thresholds come from the
World Inequality Database (WID). These synthetic dataset distributions are rightskewed to reflect within-group income inequality (See Appendix A for detailed
methodology).
For IPUMS CPS households that meet the WID threshold I extract their CO2e
intensity per dollar income values, bootstrap these into the same size as the
synthetic datasets and allow the values to vary +/- 25%, to reflect the natural
variation in GHG intensity that exists across households income sources. This is
separately done for both wage income and investment income because they have
different CO2e multipliers. In addition to under-sampling top 1% household CPS, top
coding and limited reporting on capital gains and investment income necessitated
an additional treatment of the share of income coming from capital (as opposed to
wages). Here I use annual Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates on the share
of top 1% income from capital and estimate the next 0.9% and top 0.1% share based
on CBO’s estimation (96). The WID income estimates and the bootstrapped CPS
households are both ordered and matched based on total income rank. Income
related to retirement, healthcare, and public benefits from the CPS households are
then directly subtracted from the WID income estimates, though these make up an
exceedingly small share of income (and emissions) for top 1% households. The
remainder is considered earned income. Using CBO estimates, this income is broken
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into the share related to wages and share related to capital. These, along with
healthcare and benefits are matched with the corresponding GHG intensities and
multiplied. Summing all categories yields pre-tax income-based GHG footprints for
next 0.9% and top 0.1% groups. Post-tax footprints are calculated by reducing this
footprint in proportion to the household’s tax rate, which comes from the
bootstrapped CPS top 1% households.
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CHAPTER 4
4

TOTAL-RESPONSIBILITY BASED U.S. HOUSEHOLD CARBON FOOTPRINTS

4.1 Abstract
Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions occur to produce wealth, goods and
services for people. Yet, extreme inequality, both between and within countries
often results in a powerful disconnect between those who ultimately benefit from
these emissions and those who are harmed. Harms disproportionately accrue to
economically, socially, or racially marginalized people (and to future generations)
while benefits are disproportionately captured by wealthier, socially, and racially
favored groups within and across societies (and by the current generation).
Chapters 2 and 3 examined this flow of benefits to U.S. households using consumerbased and income-based (supplier and producer) responsibility principles. This
Chapter examines 20-years of U.S. household total (or shared) GHG responsibility,
based on the total benefits a household receives, as both a producer and consumer,
from GHG emissions. I find significant inequality across groups, with the top 1% of
U.S. households increasing their total-responsibility GHG emissions over the last 20
years (+11%), while the bottom 99% of households have decreased their emissions,
with all deciles showing an 8-21% decline. The total responsibility framework best
captures the full range of benefits a household receives from GHG emissions and
policies that take into account total household responsibility may be best suited to
address the unsustainably high GHG footprint of U.S. households.
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4.2 Significance Statement
At least since the start of the industrial revolution, the creation of income,
goods and services has involved the emission of GHGs. In modern economies the
income and consumption benefits, enabled by these emissions, largely ultimately
flow to households. Yet a holistic household-level accounting of GHG emissions, that
includes both income and consumption responsibility, has never been done, either
for the U.S. or indeed for any country. In this chapter, I investigate and report what I
believe is the first total GHG responsibility accounting of households that captured
their dual role as both producers and consumers. I find significant inequality across
income groups, with the top 1% of U.S. households, increasing their emissions over
time, driving a significant share of national emissions, and having emissions well
above an equitable distribution. This work informs environmental justice and
domestic and international climate policy discussions; particularly those centered
on climate equity.

4.3 Introduction
Over the last century, humanity transformed nature at an unprecedented
scale. Such transformation produced incredible benefits across a variety of human
well-being metrics; including greater wealth, material abundance, nutritional access,
longer lifespans, clean water access, safe shelter, and creating an infrastructure that
fosters human connections across space (97, 98). However, at scales ranging from
local to global, anthropogenic environmental transformation also creates harm (5,
72

15, 99). Harm is done to nature, most dramatically in biodiversity loss and
extinction and harm is done to people from toxic pollution exposure, deadly heat
waves, homes and communities made uninhabitable by climate change, novel virus
exposure, and a range of other damages to economic life, social well-being, and
health.
The distribution of these benefits and harms is not equitably shared. At both
the national and sub-national level, the rich disproportionately capture benefits
while the poor are disproportionately burdened with harm (66, 68–70). Chapters 2
and 3 explored household-level greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions responsibility
based on how the consumption (21, 25, 28–30, 38) and income benefits (40–46),
created by GHG emissions, are distributed across U.S. households. While separately
analyzing consumption and income-based emissions highlight different scales of
inequality, drivers, and policy responses for GHG inequality they do not fully capture
the total responsibility of households based on their dual roles as both producers
and consumers. Here I present results for a shared responsibility (44, 47–50)
framework where emissions related to a household’s income and consumption
contribute equally to its overall GHG footprint.15
Results cover twenty years (1996-2015) and link consumption, production,
and supplier emissions responsibility to U.S. households. Emissions multipliers are
derived from Eora, a highly granular global multi-region input-output (MRIO) model
covering 190 countries (57, 58). Consumption multipliers are derived from a 10,211
Income-responsibility is calculated as the average of supplier and producer responsibility. This is
then averaged with the consumption responsibility emissions to obtain a GHG footprint that is a 5050 split between income and consumption footprints.
15
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x 10,211 commodity-by-commodity table, while income responsibility is based on a
9,812 x 9,812 industry-by-industry model (see Materials and Methods).
Consumption data come from Consumer Expenditure Surveys (CES) and Income
from IPUMS harmonized Current Population Survey (CPS) (63). Households are
binned into income groups that include a breakout of decile 10 into the next 9% (9099th percentile), top 1% (99.0th - 100th percentile), next 0.9% (99.0th - 99.9th
percentile), and top 0.1% (99.9th - 100th percentile) (see Materials and Methods for
how I estimate consumption and income for top 1% households, which are under
sampled in both CES and CPS).

4.4 Results
4.4.1 Time Series: 1996-2015
4.4.1.1 Supplier and Producer - shared income responsibility
Income is generated when fossil fuels are extracted by industries and when
they are used by industries. The downstream supplier accounting method links
emissions to income generated by the first and the direct producer accounting
method links income with emissions related to the second. As my work on incomeresponsibility shows, depending on the framework used, households will have
different emissions responsibilities. One way to handle the discrepancy between
methods is to allocate some responsibility from each method to the household. Here
I create a shared-income responsibility by having each method count for half of the
household’s income responsibility.
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I find the post-tax national average declined 15%, from 37.5 to 32.0 metric
tons (mt) CO2e. Deciles 1 and 2 remained essentially flat, respectively decreasing
4% and increasing 2%. Deciles 3-10 all fell between 8% - 25%. Meanwhile the top
1% increased 6%, with the top 0.1% increasing 21% to 1,623 mt CO2e (Fig. 4.1).
With a post-tax income responsibility, the next 0.9% emissions declined 2%.
Whereas in a pre-tax calculation all deciles fell 6% - 25% and the next 9% fell 15%.
In contrast, the next 0.9%, top 1% and top 0.1% respectively increased 6%, 17%, and
35% in the pre-tax calculation.

Fig. 4.1: Shared producer and supplier income responsibility (post-tax)
average metric tons CO2e emissions (1996-2015), per income group. Shading
is standard error. Colored shading is standard error, gray box shading
indicates recession, vertical dashed lines (2001-2003) and dotted line (2013)
respectively indicate tax cuts and tax increase for the highest tax bracket.
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4.4.1.2 Supplier, Producer, Consumer – total shared responsibility
Here I calculate a comprehensive total household responsibility based on
post-tax income (supplier and producer 50-50 split) and consumption. This
captures emissions related to the full range of economic and consumption benefits
of households and accounts for emissions transfers via taxes and social benefits. I
find a 14% decline, in national average emissions, from 43.4 to 37.1 mt CO2e (Fig.
4.2). All deciles declined between 8% and 21%. Even the relatively affluent next 9%
group fell 15%. But unlike the lower 99% of the income distribution, the top 1%,
next 0.9%, and top 0.1% increased their total emissions 11%, 2%, and 28%. The top
1% and top 0.1% had average emissions of 311 and 1,280 mt CO2e, in 2015.

Fig. 4.2: Total responsibility (supplier, producer, consumer) mean household
metric tons CO2e emissions (1996-2015) per income group. Colored shading is
standard error, gray box shading indicates recession, vertical dashed lines
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(2001-2003) and dotted line (2013) respectively indicate tax cuts and tax
increase for the highest tax bracket.
4.4.2 Income, Population and Emissions Trends
Per household and per dollar CO2e intensity fell under the supplier, producer,
and consumer frameworks, as did total U.S. supplier and producer emissions (Fig
4.3). Total U.S. consumer emissions increased slightly, but far less than the growth
in total population and dollars per household. Yet, this national average income
growth belies the truly remarkable income growth within the top 1% groups. Higher
income directly affects these households income-emissions responsibility and
results in increased consumption that drives consumption-based GHG emissions.

Fig. 4.3: Percent changes (1996-2015) in income, population, spending, total
and average U.S. CO2e emissions, and CO2e intensity for both producer,
supplier, and consumer frameworks, relative to 1996 base year.
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4.4.3 Most Recent Year (2015)
With the total household responsibility framework the top decile, in 2015,
had mean (x̅ ) emission of 101.2 mt CO2e (median (x̃ ) = 72.6) (Fig 4.4) and accounted
for 27% of U.S. emissions. The emissions share of these top 10% households is just
about equal to the collective emissions from the bottom 50% of households (deciles
1-5), who account for 28% of national emissions. Within the top decile, the top 1%
alone account for 8% of total national emissions (x̅ = 311, x̃ = 193 mt CO2e). The next
0.9% accounted for 5% of national emissions (x̅ = 203, x̃ = 182 mt CO2e), and the top
0.1% was responsible for 3.5% of national emissions (x̅ = 1,280, x̃ = 1,014 mt CO2e).
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Fig. 4.4: Mean total household responsibility mt CO2e emissions (2015) per
income decile, with Decile 10 broken into top 1% and next 9%. The width of
each income group, on the x-axis, corresponds with each group’s share of total
national CO2e emissions. Bars are standard error.
The absolute scale of inequality between groups is stark, with next 0.9% and
top 0.1% households having emissions 15x and 97x (1,438% and 9,582%) larger
than decile 1 households (Table 4.1). This inequality comes into even sharper focus
when comparing the share of national emissions used by each group in relation to
their population share. In an equitable distribution, there would be no difference
between these two. Here though, I find deciles 1-6 have negative emissions share
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(Fig 4.5). Decile 1’s emissions share is 65% lower than what it would be in an
equitable distribution, decile 7 is essentially equal to it’s share, and the top 1% is
8.4x (736%) larger than its population share. The top 0.1% is responsible for a share
of national emissions 34x (3,343%) higher than its population share.

Table 4.1: Comparison (times larger) of mean household emissions, per U.S.
income group.
U.S. income groups
(times larger)
U.S.
income
groups

(mtCO2e)

Decile
1

Decile
5

(13.2 mt) (28.2 mt)

National
household
average

(37.1 mt)

Decile
10

Decile 10
next
9%

top
1%

top 1%
next
0.9%

top
0.1%

(102 mt) (77.8 mt) (311 mt) (203 mt) (1280 mt)

super
emitters
(3738 mt)

Decile 1
(13.2 mt)

1

2.1

2.8

7.6

5.9

23.5

15.4

96.8

283.2

Decile 5
(28.2 mt)

0.5

1

1.3

3.6

2.8

11.0

7.2

45.4

132.6

National
househol
d average
(37.1 mt)

0.4

0.8

1

2.7

2.1

8.4

5.5

34.5

100.8

Decile 10
(101.1
mt)

0.1

0.3

0.4

1

0.8

3.1

2.0

12.7

37.0
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Fig. 4.5: Total household emissions share relative to population share (%
difference), for income groups (2015). A zero value on the y-axis indicates an
equitable distribution. Width on the x-axis represents the group’s share of
national emissions.
In all responsibility frameworks (supplier, producer, consumer, and shared
total responsibility) top income households are responsible for significantly
absolute emissions and a meaningful and disproportionate share of national
emissions. Yet, the accounting choice does change group emissions estimates. For
the lower 99% of households, moving from an income responsibility (post-tax
supplier producer split) to the total household footprint increases their emissions
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footprint (Fig. 4.6). This is because social welfare programs, at the bottom of the
distribution, and very high savings rates, at the top of the income distribution, make
consumption more evenly distributed than income. Thus consumption footprints
are higher than income footprints for most income groups. But for next 0.9% and top
0.1% households this trend is reversed (Fig. 4.7). A key factor here is that high
savings rates for top income households reduce their consumption emissions, but
don’t reduce their income-based footprints, even if that income is saved for future
use.
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Fig. 4.6: Percent difference, for each income group, between their post-tax
shared supplier and producer average and the total responsibility footprint
(including consumptions) (2015).
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Fig. 4.7: Percent difference, for each income group, between their
consumption-based footprint and the total responsibility footprint (including
post-tax shared supplier and producer average) (2015).
4.4.4 Relationship to Racial Inequality
In the post-tax total responsibility framework, white non-Hispanic
households have emissions (40.0 mt CO2e) that are 44% higher than black
households (27.7 mt CO2e) and 30% higher than white Hispanic households (30.8
mt CO2e). Across all post-tax emissions frameworks (supplier, producer, and
consumer) white non-Hispanic households have emissions that are between 42-
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55% higher than black households and 28-33% higher than white Hispanic
households.
This emissions inequality reflects the larger issue of racial economic
inequality in U.S. society. Median income of white households is 69% higher than
black households and 35% higher than Hispanic households. This income inequality
results in different levels of consumption and results in significant income-based
and consumption-based differences in GHG emissions responsibility across racial
lines.
4.4.5 Super Emitters
I estimate 4% of top 0.1% households have consumption-based emissions
above 3,000 mt CO2e and 3-10% of top 1% households have income-based
emissions above this “super emitter” threshold. In the total responsibility
framework super emitters average 3,623 mt CO2e when consumption basedemissions above 5,000 mt CO2e are dropped, or 3,738 mt CO2e when they are
included. About 5-6% of top 0.1% households likely count as total-responsibility
super emitters.

4.5 Discussion
4.5.1 Relationship of Emissions Inequality to Income Inequality
In 2015, the top 10%, top 1%, and top 0.1% captured 46%, 19%, and 8.5% of
all pre-tax national income (78). With the GHG total responsibility framework those
groups were responsible for 27%, 8%, and 3.5% of national household emissions.
Emissions responsibility at the very top is lower than their share of income because
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taxes, very high savings, and the purchase of less intensive GHG services reduce
emissions responsibility at the top. Meanwhile, social benefits, very low (or
nonexistent) savings rates, and the purchase of relatively higher GHG intensive
goods increase emissions footprint for lower decile households.
4.5.2 Factors shaping household footprints – comparing approaches
In pre-tax supplier or producer accounting, income is GHG footprint destiny.
Household footprints are directly determined by the amount of money received and
GHG intensity of the industry from which it is received. Because supplier and
producer footprints calculate GHG intensity differently, household’s footprints are
sensitive to the method chosen. In so much as they have agency in shaping their
GHG footprint, individuals may choose which companies to work for (constrained by
what options are available to them) or invest in. Tax policy and the value of social
benefits play an important role in shaping household’s post-tax income footprints.
Progressive taxation and regressive social welfare helps even out some of the most
extreme inequality, seen in the pre-tax pre-benefit accounting.
Consumption based footprints are determined by a household’s total amount
of spending and the types of goods and services purchased. Household agency
related to both of these drivers varies across income groups. Low-income
households have low or nonexistent savings rates and purchase more basic
necessities that tend to be more GHG intensive. Wealthier households tend to
purchase less GHG services and enjoy very high savings rates (46% for top 1% and
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57% for top 0.1% groups, in 2015). The latter significantly reduces their
consumption-based emissions.
By including both income and consumption in the total-responsibility
framework I better capture the true GHG responsibility of households related to the
benefits those emissions enable. One downside to the income-only approach is that
household choices on how that money is spent have no impact on their GHG
footprint. For example, a household actively choosing to limit their consumption and
purchase less GHG intensive goods and services will not see these personal life-style
choices reflected in their income footprint. At the same time, a consumption-only
approach misses the GHG emissions that were required to create income benefits
for a household. For example, imagine a household with a seven figure annual
income, from a fossil fuel or coal utility company, but it has extremely high savings
rates and consumes very little. High savings rates will significantly reduce
consumption emissions, yet this saved income still provides the household with real
immediate benefit, in the form of financial security, social status, and political
influence. The income-based footprint helps to capture that benefit. By combining
both approaches, the total responsibility framework better accounts for the true
range of benefits received, while including a household agency.
4.5.3 Policy Implications
Carbon pricing schemes, like cap-and-trade and carbon taxes internalize
some of the environmental and social damage, caused by GHG emissions, into the
price of final demand goods and services (82, 83). These price signals aim to shift
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consumer behavior to less GHG intensive alternatives. As I discuss in the
consumption-footprint chapter, such taxes would hit low-income families the
hardest, while extremely high savings rates of high-income families allow them to
simply absorb the tax without making any meaningful lifestyle modification.
With income-based GHG responsibility, taxing income above a certain
threshold, based on the GHG emissions it enabled or on the GHG emissions that
were used to generate it is an approach to internalize costs on the producer side.
Another approach is taxing shareholders of fossil fuel suppliers or high emitting
companies. Because stock ownership is highly concentrated among the wealthiest
households this could help focus efforts on those top income households that are
driving a disproportionate share of GHG emissions. It also has the benefit of
stimulating fiduciary fund managers to shift investment away from the taxed
industries. It would encourage divestment on fiduciary grounds alone. More work is
needed to analyze the regulatory and other costs that might be associated with such
a plan.
Considering the total-responsibility approach, where households are
simultaneously responsible as both producers that gain an income from GHG
emissions and consumers that drive GHG emissions through their purchasing
suggests that policy efforts that simultaneously target both consumption and
income may be more effective than either is alone. Carbon taxes related to income
help address the fact that high savings rates, among wealthy households, limits the
impact consumption-based taxes will have on this group. While consumption-based
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taxes would provide price signals that can help shift behavior, or at the very least
generate revenue to fund de-carbonization efforts.
Yet total-responsibility also highlights some of the limitations of households
to independently act as agents of de-carbonization. Certainly among the lowest
deciles, even in the face of a carbon tax, shifting consumption is limited by the fact
that basic necessities still need to be purchased and overly taxing income, based on
GHG emissions, is unfeasible since there is no slack in low-income household
budgets to absorb such a tax. At the high end, households have more agency to shift
spending, but they also have enough savings to simply absorb any consumptionbased taxes and maintain their consumption patterns. They also have extremely
limited individual agency in determining the GHG intensity of the industry from
which they draw a wage. Perhaps the most agency households have is in their role
as investors. This points to a strength of the shareholder-based GHG taxing
approach, since households do have high agency in nimbly redirecting investments.
While few households have significant investments, thus limiting agency for most
households, interest, dividends, and capital gains account for a significant share of
wealthy household’s income-based carbon footprint and thus a shareholder tax
could be an effective tool to encourage these households (and their fiduciary
financial advisors) to redirect investments away from fossil fuel intensive
industries.
Yet, the limits of households as independent change agents suggest other
policies are also needed to decarbonize areas of the economy over which
households have limited agency. For example, transportation infrastructure
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including high speed rail, electric vehicle charging stations, electric buses, and
adequate bike lanes impact household travel choices, but households have limited
independent influence on this infrastructure. Likewise, households generally have
little choice over the GHG intensity of their electric utility supply. But together
transport and utilities make up 50-59% of consumption-based emissions for deciles
1-9. Legislative or regulatory actions that eliminate coal power, restrict fossil fuel
development on public lands, and make investments in renewables can change the
GHG intensity of the U.S. economy in ways that household decisions simply cannot.
Simultaneously implementing a range of policies, such as carbon tax, GHGbased income and shareholder taxes, and regulatory action that reduce fossil fuel
intensive activities while stimulating less intensive alternatives would be the
quickest approach to reducing the GHG intensity of the U.S. economy. Yet, each
policy proposal brings with it a legislative fight and those most impacted by these
proposals, the wealthiest households, are the same households whose preferences
determine policy (53).

4.5.4 Equity, Climate and Environmental Justice
Over the last decade plus the scale of economic inequality and racial injustice,
within U.S. society, have become increasingly clear and urgently necessary to
address. At the same time, the existential threat posed by climate change has
worsened with another decade of insufficient action. My work reveals some of the
connections between economic and racial inequality and the GHG emissions that
drive climate change: namely, how the income and consumption benefits of these
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emissions are distributed within U.S. society and the scale of inequity in this
distribution. The total emissions responsibility of top 0.1% households is 100x
larger than bottom decile households and super emitters emissions are about 280x
larger. U.S. society cannot successfully address the climate crisis without
understanding which groups within society are driving this crisis, assigning an
appropriate level of responsibility to those households, and using this to develop
just and effective public policy. My work shows how emissions footprints vary
across economic and racial lines, how the income and consumption responsibilities
of groups differ, and the scale of GHG emissions in the total benefits received by
different groups. By illuminating these differences and proposing policies that
recognize these inequalities my work provides a new perspective on the
connections between economic class, race, and climate change and informs more
effective policy formation.

4.6 Materials and Methods
The consumer and income based GHG emissions responsibilities, that
determine total household responsibility, are calculated using an EnvironmentallyExtended Multi-Region Input-Output Model (EE-MRIO), consumer expenditures, and
income data.
Mt CO2e per dollar of consumption or income is derived from the Eora MRIO
(57, 58) covering 14,839 sectors, 190 countries, and 1,140 final demand and value
added categories. For each of the 20 years, EORA is converted from a 14,839 x
14,839 heterogeneous classification system to a square input-output table. A 10,211
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x 10,211 commodity-by-commodity IO table, using the Industry Technology
Assumption, is generated for consumption GHG intensity. A 9,812 x 9,812 industry
by industry IO table, using the Fixed Product Sales Structure assumption, is
generated for income GHG intensity (95). Direct emissions data, for six Kyoto GHGs,
come from the PRIMAPHIST database (available in Eora) (90). Consumption-based
emissions are linked to household purchasing using Consumer Expenditure Surveys
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (see the Chapter 2 for detailed methodology).
Income-based emissions are linked to household income using IPUMS CPS, a
harmonized Current Population Survey database (63) (See Chapter 3 for detailed
methodology). For both, top 1% households are under-sampled in the underlying
survey data. I estimate the consumption and income of these households by
bootstrapping top 1% households that are in the surveys and matching them with
simulated high income household income distributions, using data from the World
Inequality Database (78). Household GHG footprints are estimated and households
are binned into income groups. To calculate the shared total responsibility, the
supplier and producer income responsibility, of each group, are averaged. This
yields an income-based footprint where half the responsibility comes from the
supply-based emissions responsibility and half from production-based income
responsibility. This income footprint, for each group, is then averaged with the
group’s consumption-based responsibility. Yielding a total household responsibility
where both income and consumption contribute 50% to the total footprint (see
Appendix A for additional methods).
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CHAPTER 5
5

CONCLUSION

5.1 Introduction
Despite having about 4% of the global population, the U.S. accounted for about
14% of global production-based CO2 emissions, in 2019 (100), and remains the
largest historical GHG emitter. Within the U.S., households are a key group, as their
direct emissions and consumption drive about 80% of U.S. emissions (35). Indeed,
decades of high emissions (incompatible with climate stability) have yielded
significant income and consumption benefits for U.S. households.
Thus, if the world is to successfully address the climate crisis, the U.S. is a
critical player and U.S. households are a key group. Yet, significant economic and
racial inequality within U.S. society results in very different levels of emissions
responsibility across households. My work quantifies the scale of this inequality and
its relation to GHG emissions responsibility. I have done this by tracking the flow of
GHG emissions embodied in the consumption and income benefits received by U.S.
households using four accounting frameworks: consumer, producer, supplier, and
total (shared) responsibility. By revealing the scale of inequality within these
different responsibility frameworks, my work reveals the true scale of emissions
inequality within U.S. society, informs social justice narratives, and highlights
possible policy opportunities.
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5.2 Comparison with prior study and novelty of work
U.S. household consumption-based emissions have previously been
investigated. For 2004, Weber and Matthews (38) estimated average U.S. household
emissions between 43.5 - 60.8 mtCO2e. My 2004 estimate is right in this range, at
48.2 mt CO2e. Jones and Kammen find household emissions of about 43.5 mt CO2e,
for 2005, close to my findings of 47.3 mt CO2e. For 2007, Ivanova et al. (52),
estimated U.S. per capita emissions were 18.6 mt CO2e, while my 2007 results align
quite well at 18.66 mt CO2e. Feng et al. (28) estimate 2015 per capita emissions at
16.4 mt CO2e, while I estimate 17.3 mt CO2e. Finally, the only time series analysis I
am familiar with for U.S. households is Song et al. (29), they find per capita
emissions between 1995-2014 averaged between 16.1 and 18.7 mt CO2e. I find
1995-2015 emissions averaged between 15.6 and 20.0 mt CO2e. At the household
and per capita level my estimates seem to fit in line with previous work.
While general agreement on these average estimates ground my work in prior
research, the novelty of my approach is in the granularity of the analysis and the
focus on top income households. Prior work at the individual household-level has
only gone up to about $160,000 (in 2020 dollars) and 100 mt CO2e (Fig. 5.1). I
expand the income bounds roughly 100x and emissions bounds 50x. While prior
work has found the scale of inequality between their top groups and bottom group
was about 3x (28) to 5x (29) different, I find, in 2015, the difference between my top
income group (top 0.1%) and the bottom decile is 54x, and the difference between
super emitters and the bottom decile is 209x. The scale of inequality I reveal is at
least 10x larger than what has previously been reported.
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Fig. 5.1: Comparison (log-log), of my study with prior work, in terms of dollars
and mt CO2e in scope. Prior study upper income boundary is based on
threshold for highest income group reported. My household-level approach
allows us to estimate emissions for individual households above $10,000,000.
Feng et al. is per capita. Note: these are visual approximations.
In terms of supplier or producer income responsibility, a visual like Fig. 5.1 is
not possible because no prior work at all has been done to calculate household-level
GHG emissions using income-based accounting for the U.S. or any other country. To
my knowledge, all prior work has been done at national, regional, or sectoral levels
(40–46). This misses a key connection between GHG emissions and the economic
benefits these emissions enable for households. I find the scale of inequality in this
distribution is even more striking than consumption-based inequality. If just pre-tax
income is counted here (before social benefit transfers accrue to the bottom and
95

taxes reduce income at the top) the difference between the top 0.1% and the bottom
decile is about 1,700x – 2,000x higher, depending on the choice of producer or
supplier framework.
Another novel contribution of my work is determining how footprint
inequality differs by race. While racial inequality related to the environment has
been previously studied (67, 69, 70, 74), to my knowledge it has never been
analyzed in the context of household GHG emissions. I reveal significant disparity
between households, with white non-Hispanic household emissions far higher than
black (42-81% higher depending on accounting method) and Hispanic households
(28-37% higher).

5.3 Narratives
Over the last decade plus there has been growing social and political
engagement (Occupy Wall Street, the Sunrise Movement, and Black Lives Matter)
focused on issues of inequality, racial fairness, and climate justice. Recently there
has been a growing understanding that these issues are connected. Yet the scale of
emissions inequality between groups has not been well understood. Even in the
Green New Deal, perhaps the most ambitious policy proposal to date, to address
both economic inequality and climate change, the connection between these two are
only made in terms of environmental harm (how environmental harm exacerbates
systematic injustice of poor or socially marginalized groups) (101). It does not
articulate that this harm is ultimately driven by an inequitable distribution of
benefits; namely an uneven consumption distribution where top income households
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disproportionately drive CO2e emissions. This is perhaps unsurprising as both
political considerations and the data needed to inform such an analysis were
barriers to its inclusion. But my work here provides a powerful new narrative on
how these issues are connected; how income inequality drives emissions inequality
and why the scale of this inequality matters for public policy.

5.4 Household agency
One application of my findings is in determining the scale of GHG reduction
that is possible due to individual household agency. One way to access the range of
agency available to households is by comparing households within an income group
to see the emissions spread. In 2015, the top 1% of households had consumptionbased emissions ranging from a minimum of 21 to a maximum of 4,910 mt CO2e. Yet,
this includes households with just over $500,000 in income to those earning over
$10 million. Looking at the more narrow next 0.9% group (where the maximum
income spread is about $1.7 million), the range is 21 - 813 mt CO2e with
consumption-based footprints, 92 - 1,078 mt CO2e (supplier income), 131 - 1,895 mt
CO2e (producer income), and 44 – 890 mt CO2e with total-responsibility accounting.
This spread is determined by a range of factors including differences in income,
regional differences that impact consumption (like GHG intensity of the electric
grid), regional differences in GHG of employment, and household choice.
Because I model individual household emissions, I can control the withingroup income spread by focusing on households at a given income level. In 2015,
households around $1 million in after-tax income had consumption emissions
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between about 100 – 900 mt CO2e, producer income around 300 - 1000 and
supplier income around 200 to 900 mt CO2e. This large spread suggests households
do have some agency in shaping their footprints, though as described above,
household choice is only one of several factors shaping this spread.

5.5 Policy implications and future directions
The potential policy applications of my findings are discussed in the individual
chapters. Here I discuss how all of these findings together may inform policy and
what future work could be done to further develop these applications. Considering
all the footprints together, one thing is abundantly clear: regardless of the
accounting method chosen there is a startling difference between those at the very
top and everyone else. The degree of emission inequality is quite striking. This
presents both a challenge and an opportunity for policy making. If some kind of
consumer-facing carbon pricing is to be implemented, via cap and trade or a carbon
tax, setting such a tax high enough to change behavior of this extremely wealthy
group is likely quite challenging. Because savings rates are so high among this
group, they can largely choose to maintain their consumption habits, absorb the tax,
and still have very high savings rates. Setting the tax high enough where it would
actually change behavior would likely be so high that it would be impossible for less
wealthy households to pay it and thus politically untenable. Perhaps the best effect
such a tax might have vis-à-vis this top income group is generating revenue to fund
government de-carbonization efforts. Alternatively, an income or shareholder tax
may be a tool to better focus on top income households. Because the tax could be
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targeted to those over a certain income, or on investment income (which is
disproportionately the realm of wealthy households) a tax here may better shift
behavior among top income households. For example, by putting a tax on shares of
fossil fuel companies, it may encourage them to divest from fossil fuel companies,
whereas a consumption-based carbon tax hitting private jet fuel cost, perhaps
wouldn’t be high enough to encourage less flying. This approach fits with and could
help justify existing policy proposals, such as a wealth tax. Basing a wealth tax on
the carbon intensity of the sources of that wealth provides a straightforward
justification for the tax, provides an opportunity to reduce or avoid the tax by
shifting investments to less GHG industries, and by using tax-generated revenue to
fund government de-carbonization efforts, like cleaner transportation or energy
infrastructure the tax would not only shift behavior but would fund carbon
reduction efforts. Yet, while policy can help shift some household actions and fund
de-carbonization, households are also only one actor in the economy and their
agency is limited. They can’t directly determine the GHG intensity of basic
necessities, for example, the public transportation options available to them, the
availability of electric vehicle charging stations or the GHG intensity of their
employers. Coordinated efforts by government via legislation and regulation, such
as a clean power plan that sets carbon efficiency standards or investments in
renewable energy and public transportation infrastructure are also desperately
needed.
Finally, while the policy window to turn any of these ideas into reality is
limited, there doesn’t have to be a choice between one policy or the other. The most
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effective solution would likely be all of the above: a consumer facing carbon tax that
encourages less GHG intensive consumption, an income tax for high income
households that reflects the scale of GHG emissions used to generate that income, a
shareholder tax on fossil fuel supplier or large emitters that internalizes the social
and environmental damage caused by those corporations, and direct government
action (at least partly funded through some of these taxes) that invests in green
infrastructure, sets electric vehicle fleet standard, and restricts fossil fuel extraction
and combustion activities. By simultaneously implementing a range of policy
solutions it could move the U.S. economy to a level of emissions that will preserve
life on this planet. Though I am not naïve about the extreme difficulty in actually
turning these ideas into law and the additional work that needs to be done to
analyze the effectiveness and cost of these proposed policies. Indeed, now that I
have articulated the scale of inequality and identified some of its implications, I hope
this is an area of future research that others will pursue, namely analyzing an
income or shareholder carbon tax.

5.6 Other research directions
Beyond quantifying the scale of inequality across income groups, the
databases I have created provide other opportunities to quantify GHG emissions
footprints relationship to other variables. Here I quantified racial inequality in GHG
footprints, in 2015. This can be done across the whole 20-year dataset to see trends
in this inequity. Single year and time series state level or regional GHG analysis is
also possible. How GHG footprints vary across age can also be calculated with this
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dataset, giving insight into an important factor that influences inter-generational
equity discussions. As additional years of Eora MRIO, emissions, income, and
expenditure data become available, the code I have written to extract relevant data
can quickly process it and update the analysis.
This database could be turned into an online tool where individuals or
organizations could calculate their supplier-income, producer-income, or
consumption based footprints. Giving the user insights into the scale of their
emissions, the areas of their income or spending that are most GHG intensive, reveal
how they compare to other groups in the country, and help give them agency to
reduce their emissions. It could also be used to show what the effect of different
policy solutions (like carbon tax, income carbon tax, or shareholder tax) might have
on their budget.
Beyond GHG emissions, the relationship between economic, inequality, race,
region and other variables can be examined. Eora contains additional environmental
satellite accounts, such as water, nitrogen, and raw materials that can be calculated
with minor code alteration and linked with U.S. households’ income and
consumption.
Furthermore, I analyzed one country. The novel method of bootstrapping top
1% household expenditures and income sources to account for under-sampling in
national surveys could be applied to countries around the world. The World
Inequality Database (WID) contains fine-grained income data for a growing
collection of countries. Using WID data and relevant national surveys, the
techniques I pioneer here could be used to better understand top income household
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footprints within countries around the world. If other researchers pursue this, a
further step is to then be able to compare the GHG, or other environmental
footprint, of top income households across countries.

5.7 Conclusion
In my lifetime, global GHG emissions and the share of income going to the top
1% of U.S. households have both roughly doubled. Neither trend is sustainable.
While fossil fuels have created wealth and previously unimaginable levels of
material comfort, GHG emissions have begun undermining the wellbeing of both
humanity and nature. The U.S. and most countries on earth are far from where we
need to be if we are to maintain a livable climate. Likewise, extreme economic
inequality cannot flourish while having a fair, stable, and just society. Cracks in
democratic norms and the very fabric of our society have been exacerbated by many
forces, but economic inequality and erosion of economic opportunity certainly plays
a key role in the sense of cultural dispossession and grievance that has motivated a
lurch towards despotism. By quantifying the scale of GHG emissions inequality, both
within the U.S. and as compared to global income groups, and discussing some
policies that recognize this inequality, my hope is that this work will contribute to
the much needed social and policy debates that need to occur if U.S. society and
indeed humanity is to successfully navigate the climate crisis and create a more just
society as it does so.
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Appendix A
6

Footprints Supplemental Material

6.1 Methods
6.1.1 Challenges with the Top Income Groups
The CES database that I use for extracting household consumer expenditure
data and calculating consumption-based GHG footprints, under-samples highincome households and those that are present tend to be on the lower-income side
of the top 1%. For example, in 2015, a top 1% income household, as reported by CES,
earned at least $326,000 and had an average income of $451,000. Converting World
Inequality Database (WID) top 1% adults to tax units, I estimate a U.S. household
needed to earn at least $535,000 and had an average income of $1,480,000: this is
over a million dollar difference in the group’s mean income (78). Meanwhile,
according to WID a top 0.1% household needed to earn at least $2.275 million, in
2015. There were no top 0.1% households in the CES database.
Like CES, the IPUMS CPS that I used to extract household income data and
calculate their producer and supplier income-based GHG responsibility, also under
samples top 1% households. For example, in 2015, a top 1% income household, as
reported by IPUMS CPS, earned at least $536,000, which is almost exactly the same
as the top 1% threshold reported by WID, but the average IPUMS CPS top 1%
household income was $879,000. The WID average of $1.48 million is about
$600,000 (68%) higher than the IPUMS CPS top 1% mean. In IPUMS, CPS to count as
a top 0.1%, households needed to earn at least $1.2 million and they had an average
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pre-tax income of $1.39 million. Meanwhile WID estimates a top 0.1% threshold of
$2.28 million and a mean of $6.67 million, or about $5.3 million (383%) higher than
the CPS top 0.1% average.
To account for this under-sampling, I estimate top 0.1% and next 0.9%
expenditures and income by creating synthetic datasets of households with income,
whose mean income matches WID estimates and whose distribution is right skewed
(to capture the significant inequality even within these groups) (Fig. 6.1). The first
challenge is that WID average and threshold income data is for adults, while CES
data is in consumer units (i.e. households). To better match the WID and CES units I
convert WID estimates from adults to tax units (which combines incomes of married
couples). This is done by calculating the percent difference of national income
captured by each group and increasing the tax unit income proportionally (102). In
practice, I estimate pre- and post-tax income of tax units are respectively about 68% and 7-9% higher than adult (equal-split) unit incomes.
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Fig. 6.1: The right-skewed synthetic household income distribution for the
next 0.9% income group (2015) bounded within WID lower and upper income
thresholds. The blue line represents the group mean: $903,187. (n=1000). The
top 0.1% distribution has a similar form.

6.1.1.1 Estimating Income-based footprints
Income based footprints are estimated by first bootstrapping IPUMS CPS
households that surpass the top 1% WID threshold into a matrix that matches the
WID synthetic income estimate distribution length. Next, the CPS households are
ranked into ascending order by total household income, the WID income estimates
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are also ranked into ascending order and the WID estimates are applied to the
correspondingly ranked household. From this I subtract the dollar value of
retirement, healthcare, and public benefits received, with the remaining amount
considered earned income that can be broken into wage income and capital income.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the CPS estimates for capital income sources are
lacking, particularly post-2009. For 2009 and earlier capital gains are estimated for
households, but this is dropped post-2009. Capital gains and investment income is
an import source of overall income for top 1% households. Failing to break the
dataset up into wage income and capital income will lead to inaccurate CO2e
estimation since the CO2e multipliers differ for these income sources. This is
accounted for by extracting CBO estimates for capital and income share, for top
income households (96). Using this average, I generate a normally distributed
dataset whose mean is equal to CBO values and whose length equals the
bootstrapped CPS households. These income share values are subtracted from 1,
with the remaining percent representing wage income share. These shares are then
multiplied by the WID total income estimates, yielding dollar value estimates related
to each household’s capital and wage income.
Along with retirement, healthcare, and benefits these are matched with the
corresponding CO2e multipliers and the pre-tax mt CO2e per income category is
calculated. Here, to account for natural variation between household wage income
sources, I apply a +/- 25% random variation to the original bootstrapped household
wage-based GHG intensity. This +/- 25% random variation is also done for
household’s capital income CO2e multipliers. Summing all income categories yields
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each household’s total pre-tax mt GHG footprint. To calculate post-tax footprints,
estimated tax rate (percent paid in taxes) is derived from the bootstrapped CPS top
1% households and household mt CO2e footprints are reduced by this percent,
yielding the household’s post-tax footprint.
Households are then organized into different economic groups to compare
emissions. The top 1% CO2 emissions are estimated using a weighted mean, median,
and weighted standard error of the top 0.1% and next 0.9% groups. The CO2e per
capita, per household and per dollar (Fig 3.2) and the racial breakdown of emissions
per decile are calculated using a representative sample from the top 0.1% and next
0.9% groups.
6.1.1.2 Estimating expenditures and consumption footprints
To calculate consumption-based footprints I first take the synthetic WID
estimated distribution of top income households and estimate and apply tax rates to
each household. Top 1% tax rates are derived from the IPUMS Current Population
Survey (CPS), which has better sampling of high-income households than CES. From
the CPS, I sample households that meet the WID top 1% income threshold. The mean
(x̄ ) and standard deviation (s) tax rate from this group is used to generate a
distribution of tax rates that is subtracted from household income in my synthetic
income distribution. Savings rates are estimated by subtracting total expenditure
dollars from total post-tax income, for CES top 1% households (Fig. 6.2), generating
x̄ and s, and creating a distribution of savings rates. Mean savings rates for the top
0.1% are estimated to be 25% higher than the top 1% group, to reflect the higher
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savings that are possible for these extremely wealthy households. For each
household in the synthetic income distribution, a tax and savings rate is applied,
with the remaining post-tax post-savings income considered expenditure dollars.

Fig. 6.2: Savings rates (%) for CES households above $400,000 (2015) with
trendline and 95% confidence intervals (shaded).
To apply these total expenditure dollars across the 83 expenditure categories
I extract the percent expenditure per category, from CES households that meet the
WID top 1% income threshold. These are bootstrapped, with replacement, into
1,000 households, with percent spending per category allowed to vary +/- 50%
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from the original value, while constraining total expenditures across all categories
to 100%. This allows us to capture natural variation in spending across households.
I tested various randomization limits (+/- 5%, 25%, and 50%) and results were
fairly insensitive to threshold choice. For example, in 2015, I find only a 1%
difference in the mean and median mt CO2e, for the 0.1% income group, when
comparing +/- 5% randomization limit to +/- 50%. These expenditure percentages
per category are converted to dollar terms by multiplying them by the total
expenditure dollars per household, from my synthetic distribution. This is
multiplied by the CO2e intensity per dollar for each category, direct emissions
estimates for fuel are then added, and this yields a distribution of households with
GHG estimates per category. Summing all categories yields total GHG footprint per
household (Fig. 6.3).
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Fig. 6.3: Household post-tax income (2014) versus mt CO2e footprint with
color breakout for CES data (blue) and synthetic data: WID next 0.9% (grey)
and WID top 0.1% (gold) (log-log) . (n=16,632).
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Households can then be organized into different economic groups to
compare emissions. The top 1% CO2 emissions are estimated using a weighted
mean, median, and weighted standard error of the top 0.1% and next 0.9% groups.
The CO2e per capita, per household and per dollar (Fig. 2.2 in main text) and the
racial breakdown of emissions per decile are calculated using a representative
sample from the top 0.1% and next 0.9% groups.
In the main text, I present all deciles together with top 1%, top 0.1%, next
0.9% and next 9% households. Because the scale of GHG disparity is so high, the
lowest 9 deciles are difficult to distinguish. Here I present just deciles from 19962015, to better visualize the decile-level differences (Fig. 6.4). Note all deciles saw
emissions declines across the 20 year period.
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Mean household carbon footprint (mt CO2 e)
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Fig. 6.4: Mean household metric tons CO2e emissions (1996-2015) for each
income decile. Shading is standard error.
Each estimation I make introduces some inherent error. Most notably I
model top 1% and top 0.1% spending patterns, with some introduced variability, on
the top 1% households in the CES sample. If these estimates are not representative
of other 1% and 0.1% households, the corresponding CO2e emissions footprints I
calculate could be correspondingly over- or under-estimated. This challenge can be
seen in high year-to-year variation in top 0.1% which is very sensitive to variations
among the CES 1% households’ savings rates and expenditure patterns, particularly
in high CO2 intensity sectors like Transport and Utilities and Home Energy. Note, my
crosscheck of super-emitter households suggests it is rare for households to have
emissions in excess of 4,000 or 5,000 mt CO2e. To control the effect of such outliers,
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I drop emissions estimates higher than 5,000 mt CO2e. In 2015, just 5 out of 1,000
top 0.1% households surpassed this threshold and were dropped.
In addition, the Leontief method I employ has an inherent assumption that
CO2 per US$ intensity is an appropriate measure of embodied CO2. But, quality of
goods is an important factor determining price, so a luxury good may have the same
CO2 emissions as a cheaper good in volume terms, but using a price term will yield a
higher CO2 emissions for a luxury good. This could be addressed by estimating a
quality adjustment factor. For example, this could be achieved by either reducing
the CO2 intensity per dollar multiplier applied to spending of top income groups, or
perhaps more simply reducing the estimated dollars expenditures, by some luxury
estimation percent, to account for this decoupling from dollars and CO2 intensity. I
do not have any data estimates however, on which to base such a luxury good
reduction. For this reason and for consistency with prior studies I maintain a
constant CO2 intensity per dollar expenditure. Despite these limitations, given my
crosscheck of super-emitter footprints, I feel confident the results are a reasonable
estimation and useful methodological advance.
6.1.1.3 Super emitters – consumption-based
For a crosscheck of my super-emitter results I acquired single family home
square footage estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau. In 2015, 1% of new single
family homes completed were a minimum of 8,235 square feet. (103). My mt CO2e
per square foot estimates are based on the average of Jones and Kammen (35) and
Monahan and Powell (104). Mt CO2e of first class commercial aviation, number of
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private jets and miles travelled, number of private yachts, fuel use, and mt CO2e per
unit of fuel were acquired from a mix of non-profit, research reports, and
government sources including Atmosfair, Knight Frank, Vista Jet and Wealth-X,
Argus, Superyacht Intelligence, and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. For
context, there are over 13,500 private jets in North America, approximately 1,453
North American-owned motorized superyachts (30+ meter) and 124,587 top 0.1%
households. Private jet ownership, fractional ownership, and charters and super
yacht ownership is overwhelmingly concentrated within top 0.1% households. For
both jets and super-yachts annual emissions estimates can be even higher if it is
larger than average or used more frequently than my estimates of 293 flight hours
per year per jet (~12 full days of flight per year) and 1,009 hours of super-yacht
operation per year (~42 full days of use).
6.1.2 Consumption-based methods
6.1.2.1 Direct emissions
Direct emissions by the consumer, during the use phase, are important for
energy commodities that are combusted by the consumer; most notably automotive
fuels and home heating and cooking fuels. Combustion CO2e emissions factors, per
physical unit of fuel (units vary by fuel type), were obtained from the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency for gasoline, natural gas, heating oil, propane, and
wood (91). CO2e intensities per physical unit were converted to CO2e intensity per
US$. Annual price data were obtained from the Energy Information Administration.
Monetary data for gasoline and natural gas were adjusted using state or regional
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price data per $ of physical unit. Prices for fuel oil, propane and wood were only
available at the national level. However, for 2008 onward, these were adjusted
based on state and metropolitan status using Price Parity by Portion (PARPP). For
each household, the total embodied plus direct use for a fuels (here gasoline is
presented as an example) becomes
HGas TOTAL = 𝑄!"# × 𝐸!"# + 𝐷!"# × 𝐸!"#

(15)

where HGas Total is total household mt CO2e related to gasoline production and use.
QGas is the CO2e intensity of all direct and indirect emissions in producing one dollar
of gasoline. DGas is CO2e intensity of gasoline emissions from direct consumer use
(i.e. emissions released when gasoline is combusted in a vehicle engine). EGas is
consumer gasoline expenditure in dollars.
6.1.2.2 Price Conversions
Because the CO2e intensity of each product is being matched with consumer
purchases, Basic Price is converted to Purchaser Price, by adding four margin sheets
(Trade, Transport, Taxes, Subsidies) to the Basic Price sheet. For comparison across
time, I convert currency from current year US$ to constant 2020 US$, using the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Consumer Price Index (CPI). Note that Eora
currencies are already compatible across countries because Eora converts all
currencies into current year US$16, principally using International Monetary Fund
(IMF) Official Exchange Rates. Price adjusted rates of exchange and UN Operational
Rates are used if IMF data are not available (57).

Eora monetary units are in ‘000 (thousand) US$. I convert them to a 1 US$ unit to match household
expenditure data.
16
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6.1.2.3 Negative Values at Purchaser Prices
Eora notes that values in the margin sheets are poorly constrained during
optimization and can erroneously become negative. If values in these margin sheets
are large enough, a commodity’s CO2e intensity, at Basic Price, can become negative
at Purchaser Price. I found large negative Transport Margin sheet values were
causing seven U.S. transport sectors to have negative CO2e intensities in Purchaser
Price, i.e. the more a household purchased from those sectors (such as Air
Transport), the lower their mt CO2e emissions would be. Indeed households, with
large airline expenditures, were erroneously generating negative total household
emissions footprints. To address this, I followed the EORA recommendation to set
these seven negative Transport Sheet values to zero before adding to the other four
sheets.
I discovered a very small number of other commodities occasionally had
negative values at Purchaser Price. This was quite infrequent (between 6-34, per
year, out of 10,211 sectors). When present I either replaced it with the CO2e
intensity multiplier of a fairly comparable U.S. commodity; for example replacing a
negative Canadian air transport intensity with the U.S. air transport sector
multiplier. Or when a suitable replacement was not possible, I set that commodity’s
intensity to zero. The first approach assumes U.S. emissions intensities are
comparable to the non-U.S. sector. The second seeks to eliminate the effect of
negative values by removing them altogether. While neither approach is completely
satisfactory, both are preferable to including negative values that would
erroneously reduce emissions estimates per dollar of purchase of that commodity.
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The actual effect of either treatment choice, on household footprint estimates, is
almost nonexistent as so few categories are affected and they account for an
exceedingly small amount of the final CO2e intensity, of the final 83 expenditure
categories for U.S. consumers.
6.1.2.4 Limitations
A variety of estimation errors are possible with the methods employed here.
MRIO trade data is imperfect and import and export data reported across countries
may not exactly align. Eora makes estimations to balance such conflicts, but it is not
possible to achieve both balanced tables and be true to conflicting national reports.
The conversion from Basic Price to Purchaser Price also introduces estimation
error. Indeed, estimation errors, in the transport margin sheet, for seven U.S.
transport sectors needed to be set from negative to zero values. Additionally,
converting from symmetrical and non-symmetrical SUT, II, and CC tables, in the
original Eora, to a symmetrical CC intermediate transaction matrix involves an
Industry Technology Assumption and again moves away from the original national
data reports. The GHG data may also contain reporting or estimation errors.

Expenditures are estimated using CES survey data. This excludes foriegn purchases
and government and nonprofit expenditures that directly benefit households, such
as government benefits or government subsidized healthcare.
6.1.2.5 Handling Special Expenditure Categories
6.1.2.5.1 Food
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The CES is made up of an interview and a diary tool. While the interview
captures detailed data for about ~60-70% of total household expenditure it only
collects broad categories for food expenditures (food at home and food away). The
diary contains 18 detailed at home food categories. To take advantage of the high
category granularity of each instrument the data from each needs to be combined.
To do this, the detailed food expenditures, from the diary, are assigned to similar
households in the interview sample. Following the approach of Weber and
Matthews (9) I minimize Euclidean distance across three normalized variables
common to both datasets: food at home, family size, and total income. The detailed
food expenditures, from the diary, are then matched to comparable households with
minimal Euclidean distance estimates, from the interview. Unlike Weber and
Matthews, instead of simply allocating the diary derived dollar amounts to the
Euclidean matched interview households, I instead calculate the percent
expenditure per food category in the diary and multiply this by the total food at
home reported in the interview. The advantage to this approach is it proportionally
assigns food expenditure to the more granular food categories used in the diary, but
uses the more accurate annualized total food at home amount reported in the
interview. Because the interview measures expenditures over the previous quarter,
rather than the previous week (as is the case for the diary), the total food at home
dollars reported in the interview is a better estimate of actual annual total food at
home expenditures. As Weber and Matthews note, their approach (and ours)
introduces uncertainty as households of similar size, income, and home food
expenditures may actually purchase different kinds of food. However, these
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differences are likely quite small and not critical to overall footprint estimation,
since food at home tends to account for a relatively small share of CO2e (< 6% in
2015).
6.1.2.5.2 Durable Goods
Durable goods present a challenge with EE-MRIO analysis. Durable goods
may be purchased in one year but last many years. Many prior studies have either
ignored durable good purchases (38) or assigned all emissions to a single year (28,
29). For relatively inexpensive items like a kitchen sink or chair, the method choice
will not have a dramatic effect on a household’s CO2e footprint. But as the cost of an
item increases, the above methods can distort a household’s carbon responsibility
by underestimating, overestimating, or double counting the CO2e emissions. For
example, imagine a vehicle is purchased in one year, but driven for 15 years. All CO2
emissions are assigned for that purchasing year, even though the utility of the
vehicle is spread out over 15 years. Beyond spiking emissions estimates in the first
year, this presents a problem if the vehicle is then sold. At the time of sale, emissions
would be calculated again, based on the purchase price - thus the original
production emissions would be double counted. Buying a used car would also treat
the vehicle as though it was manufactured in that year. If automobile production has
become more (or less) energy efficient than at the time of actual manufacture, there
may be an over or under estimation.
Vehicles present a second challenge in that the price of the vehicle may not
be well tied to the actual CO2 emissions associated with its production. Producing a
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$200,000 sports car, for example, likely does not generate 10 times more CO2 than a
$20,000 economy vehicle. But using the standard CO2e/$ multiplier of EE-MRIO
would treat it as such. This luxury-inflation problem can be present in any class of
goods.
6.1.2.5.3 Vehicles
I address the vehicle issue in a novel way. Instead of multiplying the vehicle
purchase price by the Leontief derived mtCO2e/$ final demand, I take the total
consumer-based mtCO2e emitted by the auto industry, and divide this by the number
of vehicles produced.17 Going from a price to volume measure accounts for the
luxury-inflation problem. I do this for the U.S., Japan, South Korea, and Germany.
Together these four countries captured between 97% - 98% of automobile market
share in the U.S., each year between 1990-2016. Domestic and Foreign auto
production data is from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. For each country,
this yields mt of CO2e per vehicle produced.
The next calculation produces an average vehicle CO2e footprint that reflects
the unique mix of foreign and domestically produced vehicles for sale in the U.S., in a
given year. This is done by scaling each country’s CO2e footprint per vehicle, in
relation to their U.S. market share, and then summing to acquire a national
average.18 I do this for each year in the study, 1996-2015, creating a 1 x 19 vector.

Number of vehicles owned or leased are acquired from the CES database.
For example, in 2015 a vehicle produced in the U.S.A had a 39.18 metric ton CO2e footprint, while a
vehicle produced in Germany had a 15.98 metric ton CO2e. Domestic vehicles captured 45% of sales
in the U.S.A, while German vehicles captured 9% of the market. Thus the CO2 per U.S. vehicle 39.18 is
multiplied by U.S. producers market share (0.45), the German CO2 footprint (15.98 mtCO2 per
vehicle) is multiplied by German market share (0.09). Japan and South Korea are calculated in the
17
18
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But for each year, this assigns emissions to a household based on CO2e estimate
from the current year’s production and domestic/foreign mix. In other words it
assumes everyone has a brand new car each year.
To address this, I use data on miles driven per year of vehicle life to make the
CO2e per vehicle estimate proportional to the miles driven by a vehicle each year.19
Data are acquired from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. This is
used as a proxy for the number of vehicles from a given year that are in the current
year U.S. fleet. I use this to estimate the total mtCO2e of a vehicle in the U.S. fleet, in a
given year.
The final step is to depreciate the total mtCO2e of a vehicle over its lifetime.
Here, 15 years was chosen because about 95% of miles have been put on an average
car by this time, even though a diminishing proportion of cars will remain on the
road for another 10 years.20 That long tail would distort the fact that the majority of
cars do not go beyond 15 years of useful life. And, about 77% of vehicles will not
survive past 15 years (105). This yields an annual depreciated CO2e per vehicle that
reflects each years’ unique mix of foreign and domestic vehicles and vehicle ages in
the U.S. fleet. Each vehicle in a household is then multiplied by this amount.

same way, and the remaining 2-3% captured by other countries are treated as though they have
German CO2 footprints. These scaled values are then summed to equal the average CO2e footprint of
a vehicle.
19 In 2015 for example, I estimate about 9% of the cars are from 2015, 9% from 2014, about 5% from
2005, about 1.5% from 2000, etc...
20 For example, in 2015, a vehicle in the U.S. fleet (which now includes foreign and domestic mix and
vehicles produced in different years) is estimated to have required 26.8 mtCO2e in its production.
This is divided by 15 years to yield 1.79 mtCO2e per vehicle in 2015. Each vehicle a household has in
2015 is multiplied by this amount.
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6.1.2.5.4 Homes
Home down payments and mortgage outlays present a similar challenge to
vehicles, in that houses have long depreciation periods, current year emissions
estimates from the home building sector do not necessarily reflect CO2 emissions
used in an older house, and prices may not correlate well with CO2 emissions. Prior
studies have addressed this by using CO2e per square foot (35). But existing
estimates on this are somewhat out of date now. Additionally, while CES data
reports the number of rooms in the primary home, which could be used for square
footage estimates, it does not report the number of rooms in secondary or tertiary
homes. Since I am particularly interested in those at the top of the income
distribution, missing expenditures on these additional homes would be a critical
category to omit. Instead, I do the traditional multiplication of home expenses by the
CO2e/$ intensity calculated for the home commodity category. The last two studies
on the U.S., Feng et al. (28) and Song et al. (29) use this same approach. Weber and
Matthews (38) explored both methods and found their results were insensitive to
model choice.
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Fig. 6.5: CO2e intensity (mt CO2e per $1,000 (2020 USD) for each income group,
in 2015.
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